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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this Article is to construe the many layers and
different ingredients which come together in an international dispute, by
analyzing the various international dispute resolution processes that have
been attempted in particular international disputes We examine
international disputes in terms of the participants, claims, situations,
strategies, goals, and outcomes.2  For the sake of clarity and fuller
analysis, we strip disputes down to these separate components although we
are aware of their continual interlocking, intersecting, and mutual impact.
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I. For this analysis we primarily use the following international disputes: The sinking
of the Rainbow Warrior (1985); South African apartheid policies; the dispute between the
United States and Libya about the latter's involvement in international terrorism, culminating
in the bombing of Tripoli (1986); the detention of American hostages in Iran (November
1979-January 1981); the irfcursion of Soviet submarines into Swedish waters (1981-1982);
the Falklands/Malvinas dispute; the Chernobyl nuclear accident (1986); the
Venezuela/Guyana border dispute; the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (1979); the United
States' intervention in Grenada (1983); and the continuing conflict in Central America.
These conflicts were chosen to demonstrate diversity in participation, situations, attempted
processes, and outcomes, and thus allow for comparisons. Other disputes, such as the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War conflict (1990-91), will be used for illustration of
particular points. Our intention is not to discuss the legality of the claims of the respective
participants, but to analyze the nature of the disputes and the mechanisms available for their
resolution. For an often-used definition of an international dispute, see MAVROMATrIS
PALESTINE CONCESSIONS (Greece v. United Kingdom) [1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at 11
Aug. 30, 1924).] where the P.C.I.J. defined it as "a disagreement on a point of law or fact,
a conflict of legal views or interests between two persons." See generally Richard B.
Bilder, An Overview of International Dispute Settlement, 1 EM. J. INT'L Dis. RES. 1 (1986)
(a summary of other definitions).
2. We wiJsh to acknowledge our intellectual debt to the jurisprudence of Professors
Myres S. MeDougal, Harold Lasswell and Michael Reisman. See generally Myres S.
McDougal, Harold Lasswell & Michael Reisman, Theories About International Law:
Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence 43; Myres S. McDougal, Harold Lasswell &
Michael Reisman, The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision 191, Myres S.
McDougal & Michael Reisman, The Prescribing Function in the World Constitutive Process:
How International Law Is Made, 355, articles in MYRES S. McDoUGAL & MICHAEL
REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE (1981).
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Through this contextual analysis of international disputes, we hope to
highlight some of the realities of the prescriptive process and the operation
of international law. In particular, we hope to demonstrate that a
continued statist bias exists amidst an increasing accommodation of non-
state actors within the international legal system; and to demonstrate that
this statist bias undermines both a comprehensive understanding of
international disputes and all attempts to resolve such disputes.
II. PARTICIPANTS
The first task is the apparently easy one of defining the participants
in an international dispute in order to determine who should be
represented in any dispute resolution process and whose interests should
be taken into account. If any participants' interests are ignored or
underestimated, the dispute is not likely to be resolved. The statist bias
entrenched in the international legal system focuses attention on nation
states as participants. This statist perspective is overly narrow and
selective; peoples, juristic and natural persons, national liberation
organizations, aspirants to power,3 individuals committing international
offenses (and their victims), religious and spiritual organizations,4 and
governmental, non-governmental, global, and regional organizations can
all be participants in a dispute. A distinction must be drawn between the
direct protagonists, those with peripheral interests, and others who become
involved through their role in attempting to manage, contain, resolve, or
even inflame the dispute.
Even participation in a clear-cut international dispute, such as that
arising out of the 1985 sinking of the Rainbow Warrior in Auckland
Harbor,* can be wider than just nation states. Participants in that crisis
were the main disputants, (France and New Zealand), other involved
states (the United Kingdom,6 Holland 7 and Switzerland), Greenpeace (a
3. For example, the Nicaraguan Contras, and the Revolutionary Military Council in
Grenada.
4. For example, the Holy See, the Mullahs in Iran, and elsewhere in the Muslim
world.
5. See generally RICHARD SHEARS & ISABELLE GIDLEY, THE RAINBOW WARRIOR
AFFAIR (1985); JOHN DYSON, SINK THE RAINBOW! (1986); MICHAEL KING, DEATH OF THE
RAINBOW WARRIOR (1986).
6. The United Kingdom was the flag state of the Rainbow Warrior.
7. Holland was the national state of the victim who died in the bombing.
8. The French agents carried false Swiss passports.
[Vol. 7:1 1991]
ANATOMY OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
nongovernmental organization), the individual victim, the offenders (state
agents), members of the New Zealand investigatory bodies," the Secretary
General of the United Nations (as a third-party facilitator for settlement),
and the members of the arbitral tribunal established in November 1989.
The labelling of various actors as participants in an international dispute is
relevant to determining the appropriate arena and mechanisms for
attempted settlement, the patterns of responsibility and attaching liability,
and the types of reparation sought. With the settlement of a number of
claims, and at least partial reparation received by some participants, ' the
continuing dispute was narrowed down, leaving just France, New
Zealand, and the members of the arbitral tribunal as final participants.
By contrast, it may be problematic to define the situation caused
by the international response to the apartheid policies of South Africa as
an international dispute partly because of the character of the
participants. 'n The main protagonists in the dispute are the South African
government and the black populations of South Africa. However, because
9. Greenpeace is one of many groups whose operation crosses international boundaries
and whose activities have transnational impact but which are not established by
intergovernmental agreement.
10. The investigations were facilitated by women in "relief massage" parlors that were
frequented by French male agents. These women are indicative of the invisible participants
in an international dispute. See ROBIN MORGAN, THE DEMON LOVER, ON THE SEXUALTY
OF TERRORISM 149 (1989).
11. The first arbitral proceedings were before the United Nations Secretary General.
See United Nations Secretary General: Ruling on the Rainbow Warrior Affair Between
France and New Zealand, 26 I.L.M. 1346 (1987). After the premature return of the French
agents to France, a second tribunal was established. This three-person tribunal was
comprised of Dr. Eduardo Jiminez de Arechaga (appointed jointly by New Zealand and
France), Sir Kenneth Keith (appointed by New Zealand), and M. Jean-Denis Bredin
(appointed by France). Oral hearing took place in camera in the first week of November
1989. Prime Minister of N.Z., Press Release (May 8, 1990).
12. For example, Greenpeace received approximately eight million U.S. dollars for a
new vessel but received no recompense for the four years the vessel could not be used,
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, February 13, 1990, at 3. The family of the man killed
received 2.3 million French francs. Michael Pugh, Legal Aspects of the Rainbow Warrior
Affair, 36 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 655 (1987).
13. This discussion is limited to apartheid in South Africa and excludes the situation in
Namibia, which has been dealt with by the United Nations differently for a number of
reasons - notably its international character as a former mandate territory.
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the latter have no formal international standing,"4 the dispute has been
construed as one between South Africa and the United Nations. Indeed,
the United Nations had to proscribe apartheid in order to construct this
dispute.'s The range of participants is not, however, limited to these
entities. Other actors include the organizations the people of South Africa
have formed to represent them nationally and internationally, for example,
the African National Congress, front-line African States, international
nongovernmental human rights organizations, governmental
organizations, churches, international and national sport associations,
business and banking communities, trade unions, and mobilized public
opinion (as expressed through various media channels).
Even in the clearly internationalized situation of Namibia, the
International Court of Justice found it hard, in its Advisory Opinion of
1971, to see South Africa as a party to a dispute. 7 The Court side-
stepped the issue by noting that Namibia had been listed on the agenda of
the Security Council as a "situation" (not a "dispute") and that South
Africa had not challenged this categorization." At least one judge found
this to be a distortion of reality.' 9 The Court also refused to allow other
interested participants to make submissions to the Court.20 This approach
14. Compare the position within the United Nations framework of the South West
African Peoples Organization (SWAPO) and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).
"[The status of SWAPO] derives from the role of the U.N. in the context of a former
mandated territory . . . and . . . recognition by the OAU of SWAPO as a liberation
movement." MALCOLM SHAW, The International Status of National Liberation Movements,
in THIRD WORLD ATTITUDES TOWARD INTERNATIONAL LAW, AN INTRODUCTION 141, 150
(1987) (F.E. Snyder & S. Sathirathoi eds. 1987). "The PLO has by virtue of U.N. practice
attained the status of a national liberation movement through prior recognition by the Arab
League." Id. at 151. The African National Congress (ANC) is different, because South
Africa "is not as such a colonial territory"; nonetheless, apartheid has been denoted an
international crime. The ANC has observer status in the United Nations Committee on
Apartheid.
15. This process led to the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment
of the Crime of Apartheid and numerous, continuing General Assembly Resolutions. 13
I.L.M. 50 (1974). The Convention was put in force in 1976.
16. For example, the Commonwealth of Nations and the Organization of African Unity.
17. South Africa claimed that because it was a party to a dispute, the Security Council
had acted illegally in depriving it of its right of audience under U.N. CHARTER art. 32.
Further, South Africa wanted its interest in a dispute acknowledged before the Court in
order to nominate an ad hoc judge - a request that was refused. Advisory Opinion, Legal
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 19 (June 21).
18. Id. at 22-23.
19. Judge Gros thought that failing to recognize South Africa as a party to the dispute
was "a purely formal view of the facts of the case which does not . . . correspond to
realities." Id. at 26 (Gros, J., dissenting).
20. Individuals and groups that applied to make submissions to the Court under Article
66(2) of the Statute of the Court include the Organization for African Unity, the American
Committee on Africa, the International League for the Rights of Man, and individual
petitioners from Namibia. All the claims to make written or oral statements, with the
exception of that of the Organization of African Unity, were rejected by the Court.
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highlights the statist orientation of international law that the United
Nations has sought to circumvent by assuming a participatory role in
human rights disputes, despite the wording of Article 2(7) of the
Charter.n The International Court, on the other hand, cannot ignore the
explicit statist restrictions of Article 34 of its statute" and has given a
narrow interpretation to Article 6 6 (2 )." Moreover, the Court has insisted
that only states whose legal interests are threatened can appear before it;
these interests are defined in terms of states' rights rather than human
rights.' Taken together, these restrictions limit the Court's usefulness as
a dispute resolution forum when participants are not exclusively states.
Recognition of the realities of wider participation would inexorably lead to
a broader spectrum of claims voiced in the international arena than the
Court is equipped to handle.
The problem of participation in the international arena, which is
already distorted by this statist bias, is compounded by the administrative
and bureaucratic reality of the state apparatus for representation in dispute
resolution. States' interests are represented by their governments;
however, governmental representation of state interests inappropriately
assumes a unity of interest signified by full and open communications
among the different levels and branches of government. For example, the
French Foreign Affairs Department appeared caught off guard by the
activities of the French Secret Service agents in the sinking of the
Rainbow Warrior.2s Similarly, the State Department seemed unable to
convince Congress that closing down the PLO United Nations Mission in
Permission was granted to the Organization of African Unity to make an oral statement.
1971 LCJ. 16, 19. For rejection of the other claims, see Legal Consequences for States of
the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding
Security Council 276, 1970 I.CJ. Pleadings, 639, 649, 652, 672, 678-79. See also Clark,
The International League for Human Rights and South West Africa 1947-57: The Human
Rights Non-Governmental Organization as Catalyst in the International Legal Process, 3
HUM. RTs. Q. (No. 4) 101, 120-22 (1981).
21. Article 2(7) states that the United Nations is not authorized to intervene in matters
which are essentially within a state's domestic jurisdiction.
22. Article 34(1) declares that only states may be parties in cases before the Court.
23. Article 66(2) allows states and international organizations to submit written and oral
statements in advisory opinions. As seen above, the Court has limited this to public
international organizations.
24. See generally South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1966 I.CJ. 4(July 18).
25. The bureaucracies involved were the Direction G~n~ale de la Securit6 Ext6rieure
and the Direction du Centre d'Experimentations Nuclraires.
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New York would be incompatible with the United States' international
obligations.'
Because international law requires participants to be nation states,
federal realities are largely ignored in the international arena and are
undermined even by domestic decision-makers in order to conform to the
statist paradigm of international law. Although constitutive states may be
the actual wrongdoers generating a dispute, international responsibility
will be borne by the federal state, which may not even be constitutionally
competent to prevent the action. For this reason, an authoritative
domestic court may be inclined to erode constitutional limitations upon
central government power to ensure the latter's full competence when
there is a potential international dispute requiring participation in dispute
resolution processes. 27
Not all those involved in a dispute will necessarily be participants;
conversely, some nation states may become participants despite apparently
not being connected with a dispute. In fact, a claimant state may select
its adversary, thereby narrowing or widening the dispute. For instance,
the United States chose to target Libya as the sponsor of international
terrorism although other states, such as Syria and Iran, were suspected of
similar behavior. 23 Libya was an appropriate target because it appeared
militarily weaker than, for example, Syria, and because an air attack
posed minimal risk to the United States due to Libya's geographical
position. Further, the United States and Libya had a long-standing
territorial dispute over the Gulf of Sidra in which Libya had forcibly
asserted its claimed rights.2 In February 1991, Portugal commenced a
case against Australia in the International Court of Jusha with respect to
Australia's actions in East Timor. The action in question was the
26. See Advisory Opinion, Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under section 21
of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement of June 26, 1947, 1988 I.C.J. 12, 15-21
(Apr. 26). The Secretary of State asserted that "the closing of that Mission would constitute
a violation of United States obligations . . . and that the United States Government was
strongly opposed to it." Id. at 17.
27. See Commonwealth of Australia v. Tasmania, 46 A.L.R. 625 (1983), and
Richardson v. Forestry Commission, 77 A.L.R. 237 (1988), in which the High Court of
Australia upheld the power of the Commonwealth government to legislate under the external
affairs power contained in § 51(xxix) of the Australian Constitution. These decisions
lessened the vulnerability of the Australian government to becoming embroiled in disputes
relating to its performance of treaty obligations. In Dames and Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S.
654 (1981), the United States Supreme Court denied individuals' claims of constitutional
rights to preserve the authority of the President of the United States in making commitments
in the process of dealing with international disputes.
28. The accusations and sanctions against Libya climaxed with the air raid on Tripoli
on April 14, 1986. For sanctions imposed earlier, see 25 I.L.M. 173, 173-99 (1986). See
also Documents Showing the Evolution of Sanctions Against Libya, 90 RftvE GftN tAI X DE
DROIT INTERNATIONALE PUBuc 652, 652-55 (1986) [hereinafter R.G.D.I.P.l.
29. For a summary of Libya's actions with respect to the Gulf of Sidra and the United
States response, see 90 R.G.D.I.P. 652-55 (1986).
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negotiation and conclusion by Australia of the Timor Gap Zone of
Cooperator Treaty with Indonesia. This was only possible because of
Indonesia's occupation and annexation of East Timor in 1975, which has
been claimed to violate the rights of the Timors to self-determination °
The real dispute is between Indonesia and the Timorese people but the
latter have no standing in international law which provides another
illustration of the statist bias. Portugal, as a former colonial power, has
targeted Australia as its protagonist before the Court because of the
latter's acceptance of the jurisdiction of the International Court under
Article 36(2) of the statute'
Participation may be widened by one party requesting assistance
from other states. For example, the United States requested use of British
airfields to launch its bomb attack on Tripoli and requested the
governments of France and Spain to allow use of their airspace. It is also
possible that one state will assume a leadership role and attempt to
organize a collective response from either its allies or the wider
international community. An example is the role played by the United
States in mobilizing and maintaining the coalition response to the
aggression of Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. In other
situations, however, this can result in a reluctant participation through
alliances with a key participant. On the other hand, refusal to become
involved may create a separate dispute with the self-appointed leader, as
exemplified by the European rejection of certain collective sanctions
against the Soviet Union following the 1981 imposition of martial law in
Poland.3
III. CLAIMS
International claims may be legal, factual, or both.' A dispute
formally commences with the articulation of the claims by one protagonist
30. See Paul D. Elliott, The East 71mor Dispute, 27 I.C.L.Q. 238 (1978).
31. Portugal filed its application on February 22, 1991. See United Nations Press
Release, 1991 I.CJ. 495 (Mar. 6).
32. A collective response need not entail sanctions; it may be a prescriptive process to
articulate the policy of a number of participants. For instance, the South Pacific Nuclear
Free Zone Treaty, August 6, 1985, 1986 Austl. T.S. No. 32, can be seen as an expression
of common interest against French nuclear testing in the Pacific, which had previously been
formally articulated in terms of two bilateral disputes before the I.C.J. Nuclear Tests (Austl.
v. Fr.; N. Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.CJ. 253, 457 (Dec. 20).
33. Bilder distinguishes between disputes that involve claims as to fact, claims as to the
applicable law, claims as to the appropriate law, claims as to apportionment, and procedural
claims. Bilder, supra note 1, at 12-13.
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and the rejection of those claims, or the formulation of an unacceptable
counterclaim, by the other.m However, the articulation may itself inflate
the claims out of proportion and focus attention in an exaggerated way
that might prejudice resolution of the dispute. All claims need not be
verbally communicated; flagrantly provocative behavior can be construed
as a claim. Thus, it was inevitable that the 1979 seizure of American
hostages in Tehran would lead to demands for their release. Had the
Iranian government complied, there would not have been a dispute, even
though there could have been a different dispute about Iran's failure to
protect diplomats and consequent reparations.
Participants may have differing perceptions, both about when a
dispute commences, and the substance of the respective claims. The
United States timed the Tehran dispute from the taking of the hostages
and focused upon that event, while Iran emphasized the long history of
United States interference into the internal affairs of Iran.' Exactly the
same pattern was repeated in the United States' dispute with Libya as to
the substance of their dispute. The United States presented the dispute as
if it concerned territorial sea limits, the right of overflight, and state
support for international terrorism, while Libya resented what it perceived
as imperialist politics and interference. In both examples, the participants
concentrated attention upon what could be perceived as their strongest
legal case. Needless to say, if there is no agreement on what the dispute
is about, there can be little hope for its resolution. Indeed, with respect
to differing allegations of facts, there arises a problem of veracity and
verification of claims. Insistence on verification may in itself be a cause
of a new dispute, as is the case with Iraq and the United Nations
regarding Iraq's nuclear capability in the aftermath of the Gulf War.
From the outset of a dispute, communication between the participants is
essential for its resolution. Ironically, in many particularly dangerous
disputes, one of the first reactions may be to break off diplomatic
relations. 36
34. In the context of a request to intervene under Article 62 of the Statute of the
International Court, for example, Italy argued that there was no dispute between itself and
the parties (Libya and Malta) and that it merely wished to preserve its rights. This position
was ironically supported by Libya, which argued that since there had been no rejection of
Italian claims there was no dispute and therefore, there could be no intervention. The Court
held it was for itself to determine whether the request raised a new dispute and that the
Court would have to resolve it. Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), 1984
I.CJ. 3 (Mar. 24).
35. Cf. Richard Falk, The Iran Hostage Crisis: Easy Answers and Hard Questions, 74
AM. J. INT'L L. 411 (1980).
36. For example, El Salvador broke off diplomatic relations with Nicaragua in
November 1989 and accused Nicaragua of shipping arms to the rebels. Hence, a mediator
(or other third-party facilitator) may first have to attempt to formulate the dispute in terms
acceptable to all of the parties, before its resolution can even be considered.
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A dispute may be about the interpretation of international law, with
different perceptions of what international law allows or prohibits. In the
1983 downing of KAL Flight 007, the Soviet Union denied that the act
constituted a violation of international law, preferring to focus its
argument on the possible espionage activities of the airplane and the
parameters of permissible action against an intruding civilian aircraft. 7
By way of contrast, in the dispute over the 1981-1982 Soviet submarine
incursions into Swedish territorial waters, the Soviet Union denied the
acts, but because its own domestic law is essentially the same did not
contest the Swedish interpretation of the law.m
A dispute does not arise until the claims are addressed to a specific
target. The Swedish-Soviet dispute did not occur until the Defense
Committee Report named the Soviet Union as the perpetrator some
months later.39  Again, the perceptions of the substance of the dispute
differed: Sweden claimed that there had been a violation of its territorial
integrity and threat to its security, while the Soviet Union rejected this
accusation as unjustifiable and designed to undermine Soviet-Swedish
relations.
The refusal by an alleged participant to respond to the claims of
the other may be frustrating for the claimant because the existence of the
dispute is not acknowledged. This is particularly vexing when the
claimant genuinely wants to bring the issue "into the open," motivated by,
among other things, a desire to invoke a norm of international law. For
instance, in the early 1980s, Mohmar Qaddafi neither denied, nor
otherwise answered the United States' accusations that Libya was
sponsoring terrorist activities, making it virtually impossible for the
United States to commence any nonforcible method of dispute resolution,
in the absence of compulsory jurisdiction. Qaddafi pursued the same
strategy with respect to Chad's allegations of Libyan intervention and
meddling in its civil war over the Azou strip, despite evidence to the
contrary. 40 Such silence may even lead to doubts as to the existence of a
37. See 13 WORLD AFF. REP. 422, 422-28 (1983); Statement by Yuri Andropov, in 41
INT'L AFF. 3 (Sept. 28, 1983); Faroog Hassan, The Shooting Down of Korean Airline Flight
007 by the USSR and the Future of Air Safety for Passengers, 33 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 712
(1984). Compare this with the Rainbow Warrior incident in which the French argued for
the immunity of its state agents.
38. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Law on the State Boundary of the USSR
(Entered into force March 1, 1983 art. 36), 22 I.L.M. 1055, 1074 (1983).
39. Romana Sadurska, Foreign Submarines in Swedish Waters, The Erosion of an
International Norm, in INTERNATIONAL INCIDENTS: THE LAW THAT COURTS IN WORLD
POLITICS, 40, 47 (%V. M. Reisman & A. Willard eds. 1987); Ingrid Delupis, Foreign
Warships and Immunity for Espionage, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 53 (1984).
40. On the Chad-Libya dispute, see infra note 95.
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dispute, and thus, may serve to make the claimant's behavior appear
unduly provocative.
IV. SrruATIONS
Any international dispute arises and continues in a situation which
is larger than its apparent causes. The context of an international dispute
comprises a selection of the following situations: (1) religion and
ideology, and sometimes the desire to export them; (2) the geopolitical
theatre; (3) subjective perceptions of external threat; (4) long-standing
third-party intervention into internal affairs; (5) superpower policies over
a period of time; (6) economic policies, the allocation of vital resources,
and the need to maintain access to them; (7) internal politics and,
especially, the importance of domestic audiences; (8) security needs; (9)
the interests of ethnic minorities; (10) violations of human rights;
(11) personalities of members of the respective elites; (12) national pride
and prestige; (13) perceptions of justice and equality in the international
arena; and (14) the interests of non-participants and the wider international
community in ending, containing, or prolonging the dispute. Some of
these situations are within the participants' control, some clearly are not,
and all are subject to continuous change. Of course, disputes are not
static: they constantly evolve, mutate, and rearrange through the
interactions of the participants and their changing situations. The same
situations alone, or in combination, can impact on the escalation or
diffusion of a dispute and affect the environment for resolution.
The causes of international disputes are often, if not invariably,
complex. For instance, the Rainbow Warrior incident, which appeared to
arise out of a single violent act, in fact had its origins in French colonial
and post-colonial politics and the French government's insistence upon
continued nuclear testing, despite widespread regional opposition and
growing environmental concerns. The resulting French resentment was
targeted upon a transnational activist organization, Greenpeace, while it
was physically within a sovereign state. 4' In the Falklands-Malvinas
41. Cf. Charles Rousseau, France et Nouvelle-Zlande. Affaire Greenpeace, 90
R.G.D.I.P. 216 (1986); Charles Rousseau, France et Nouvelle-Z.-lande. Raglement de
1'affaire du Rainbow Warrior, 90 R.G.D.I.P. 993 (1986); France et Nouvelle-ZMlande
Echanges de Letres Relatifs au R~glernent des Problemes de 1'incident du Rainbow Warrior,
signis a Paris le 9 Juillet 1986, 90 R.G.D.I.P. 1095 (1986); Charles Rousseau, Le
Riglement de l'Affaire du Rainbow Warrior, 92 R.G.D.I.P. 395 (1988); Charles Rousseau,
France et Nouvelle - Zlande. Etat Actuel de l'Affaire du Rainbow Warrior, 92 R.G.D.I.P.
993 (1988); Jodi Wexler, The Rainbow Warrior Affair: State and Agent Responsibility for
Authorized Violations of International Law, 5 B.U. INT'L L.J. 389 (1987).
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dispute, a long-standing territorial claim to the Islands was entangled with
colonial occupation and use.' When the armed hostilities actually broke
out in 1982, the situation encompassed both these long-term claims and
new issues, including changed principles for the allocation of the
resources of the sea, potential claims to Antarctica, the strategic
importance of the South Atlantic, and the emergence of the right of self-
determination of the islanders.
In both disputes, domestic policies played an important role, with
government responses clearly being made with an eye toward the domestic
electorate.4 In the Rainbow Warrior affair, the French government
regarded its nuclear policy as a matter of national security and regarded
its colonial possessions as exclusively domestic concerns. In these
matters, successive governments have traditionally received popular
bipartisan support." Greenpeace itself was viewed with paranoia and
suspicion by the French military establishment due to the confrontational
tactics it used in 1972 and 1973, and a widespread belief that Greenpeace
was a front for other organizations which were hostile to French interests
in the South Pacific.4' After the sinking, the French Socialist government
had to defer to the public impression that it had abandoned its agents,
making them scapegoats for their government's incompetence. To make
matters worse, the incident became an electoral issue. The repatriation of
the agents to France,4' in breach of the arbitration award, revived the
dispute immediately prior to the French presidential elections. In direct
contrast, the New Zealand Labour government, then headed by David
Lange, came to power in 1984 largely on the anti-nuclear ticket. New
Zealand's festering dispute with the United States and its Western allies
42. PETER CALvERT, THE FALKLANDS CRISIS: THE RIGHTS AND THE WRONGS (1982);
JULIAS GOEBEL, THE STRUGGLE FOR THE FALKLAND ISLANDS: A STUDY IN LEGAL AND
DIPLOMATIC HISTORY (rev. ed. 1982); Gerald W. Hopple, Intelligence and Warning:
Implications and Lessons of the Falkland Islands War, 36 WoRLD POL. 339; J.C.J. Metford,
Falklands or Malvinas? The Background to the Dispute, 44 INT'L AFF. 463 (1968); F.S.
Northedge, The Falkland Islands: Origins of the British Involvement, 7 INT'L REL. No. 4,
2167 (1982).
43. Similarly, an international dispute can be used to gain support for a domestic
agenda. It has been argued that the American defense establishment pushed the
confrontation with Libya as a means of promoting the Strategic Defense Initiative. John
Pike, Qaddafi Goes Ballistic: The Strained Logic Behind SDI Lite, THE NEW REPUBLIC,
Mar. 20, 1989 at 14.
44. At the time, there was no significant peace movement in France, unlike other parts
of Western Europe. Cf. Dyson, supra note 5, at 160.
45. In fact, Greenpeace-New Zealand had strong links with the Nuclear Free Pacific
and Independent Pacific Movements which were established in Hawaii in 1980 and enjoyed
the support of a strongly anticolonial-state, Vanuatu. See King, supra note 5, at 37.
46. The first, Major Alain Marfart was repatriated in December 1987 for supposed
medical reasons and the second, Captain Dominique Prieur in May 1988 because of her
pregnancy. Both had been sent to Hao Atoll for three years detention from July 1986 as
part of the arbitration agreement.
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over the access of nuclear powered vessels to New Zealand ports made
the country especially sensitive to all nuclear issues." The flagrant
commission of a criminal act by foreign secret agents within New Zealand
territory made recourse to the criminal justice system a matter of national
prestige.4 Both of these incidents illustrate the importance of national
elections to the handling of international disputes by democratic
governments. Many international disputes span more than one electoral
term, thus becoming an issue for both the incumbent and opposition
parties. The opposition parties face a dilemma in determining how best to
exploit the government's handling of the dispute without prejudicing its
own position in case of electoral victory.9
Even without forthcoming elections, a government might need the
support it gains from taking a domestically popular stance in an
international dispute. In 1982, the Galtieri government in Argentina
needed a spectacular success to bolster its flagging popularity. Seizing the
Malvinas seemed likely to rally the people around the government, as the
continued colonial occupation of the islands had for generations been
considered a slight on national pride. British Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher also had much to gain from a successful campaign, as her
political popularity was at an all-time low. Public opinion, which had
been previously uninformed about the Falklands, swung rapidly in her
favor as the task force sailed towards the South Atlantic, making the
attempted mediation efforts doomed to failures' Similarly, the Gulf War
in early 1991 saw George Bush achieve unprecedented levels of public
approval.
By way of contrast, a domestic situation can combine with
international elements to prevent a dispute from erupting, even where
there is the potential for triggering a major international dispute. For
instance, in the case of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster,s' the elements of
the situation included, inter alia: (1) the encouraging attitudes of the
47. See Christine M. Chinkin, Suspension of Treazy Relationships: the ANZUS
Alliance, 7 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 114, 157 (1990).
48. The agents pleaded guilty to criminal charges of manslaughter and willful damage
to a vessel by means of explosives. They were each sentenced to ten years imprisonment in
New Zealand. See United Nations Secretary General: Ruling on the Rainbow Warrior
Affair between France and New Zealand, 26 I.L.M. 1346, 1351 (1987).
49. This can also be illustrated by the importance of the United States-Iran dispute in
the presidential election in November 1980. Similarly, in 1972, the Australian Labour Party
successfully used the French nuclear tests issue as a political platform.
50. United States Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, unsuccessfully attempted to
mediate.
51. See AAEC TASK GROUP, THE CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR ACCIDENT AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES, (1987); NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY OECD, THE RADIOLOGICAL IMPACT
OF THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT IN OECD COUNTRIES (1987); MIKHAIL GORBACHEV, THE
CHERNOBYL STATEMENT, MAY 15, 1986 (1987).
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Western governments toward political reforms in the Soviet Union and
their unwillingness to jeopardize the beginning of a new wave of d6tente
and progress in arms reduction talks; (2) the skillful diplomacy of Soviet
President Mikhail Gorbachev in directing attention to questions of specific
and comprehensive methods of control of nuclear power, while stressing
its overall beneficial character; (3) the congruence of Gorbachev's position
with that of the Western governments, which were concerned with not
fanning up environmental and anti-nuclear elements of public opinion;
(4) increased trade with the Soviet Union; and (5) the submissiveness of
Eastern European governments, which accepted the Soviet account that
they would suffer no damage. These factors all militated against the
making of claims which could have sparked an international dispute.
A changing domestic situation can alter the course of international
disputes, or it can create an environment conducive or otherwise to certain
dispute resolution processes.s For example, even though the Swedish
policy of repelling intruding submarines by force was put in place in
1983, there was no immediate marked change in the number of violations
of the policy. The decrease came only in 1985, which can be attributed
to a number of extrinsic factors, one of them being Mikhail Gorbachev's
coming to power in the Soviet Union.s '
The stakes of each party in a dispute may be disparate. The
absolute size and value of a disputed area are constant, but taken in
proportion to each claimant's overall territory and resources, the stakes of
the claimants may vary enormously. An example is the dispute between
Venezuela and Guyana over the Essequibo area, which comprises about
five-eighths of all Guyanan territory. It has been claimed that for Guyana
(the poorer country), the future depends upon retaining the territory.s
Relinquishing its claims would entail Guyana losing two-thirds of its
timber and beef producing area, most of its established manganese and
gold production works, its potential for hydroelectric development, and a
territorial buffer!" In the dispute over extended exclusive fishing zones
with other fishing nations, Iceland's entire economy depended upon the
success of its fishing industry, while for the other claimants, fishing was
52. See, e.g., infra., notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
53. Carl P. Salicath, Alien Submarines in Swedish Waters: The Method of Counting as
a Political Instrument, 21 CO-OPERATION AND CONFLICT Vol. XXII, No. 1, 49-55 (1987).
54. Venezuela's Claim to Most of Guyana is Alive Again as Moratorium Ends, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 20, 1982 at A3. See JACQUELINE ANNE BRAVEBOY-WAGNER, THE
VENEZUELA-GUYANA BORDER DISPUTE - BRITAIN'S COLONIAL LEGACY IN LATIN AMERICA
(1984); J.G. WETTER, The Venezuala-Guyana Boundary Dispute: An In-Depth Study of the
Nullity of an Arbitral Award, in 3 THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL PROCESS (1979).
55. We owe this information to Ms. K. Katsoolis, who wrote an excellent paper on this
dispute.
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just one of many sectors of their economy. 6 The effect of such disparity
for the process of dispute resolution is that the weaker party, with the
proportionately higher stakes in the dispute, usually remains intransigent,
for it has little room to compromise. s7
The situation that arguably exercises the greatest impact upon the
development and resolution of disputes is interdependence between
involved nations, especially in economic relations. Private or public ties
between States may be a factor for calming a dispute. Thus, in the
Rainbow Warrior dispute, New Zealand presented its claims in terms of a
breach of good faith between two essentially friendly nations and did not
seize the opportunity for gratuitous insults to France over its South Pacific
politics. New Zealand's need for continuing trade relationships with the
European communities and the French threat of trade sanctions constituted
major factors in its acceptance of arbitration by United Nations Secretary
General Perez de Cuellar.m
Although the importance of oil is especially visible in
contemporary disputes,s9 it is merely a continuation of a more general
trend spanning the centuries. International actors have always required
access to vital resources, and in a world of shrinking accessible natural
wealth, disputes about their allocation and distribution will continue. This
historical trend explains the importance of the attempted prescriptive
processes for the allocation and conservation of such resources for
preempting disputes, or providing some legal basis for their resolution."
56. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3 (July 25).
57. But in the Venezuela-Guyana dispute, the parties did eventually come to a
constructive compromise based on economic, scientific, technical, and cultural cooperation.
58. The ruling was handed down on July 6, 1986; Ruling Pertaining to the Differences
between France and New Zealand Arising from the Rainbow Warrior Affair, 26 I.L.M.
1349 (1987); 74 I.L.R. 256 (1986).
59. The importance to participants of the continued flow of oil and of possible future
exploitation is evident in the Iran-Iraq War, the United States' hostages dispute, the United
States' dispute with Libya, the Falklands-Malvinas conflict, the Greece-Turkey dispute in the
Aegean Sea, the international community response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and
numerous others.
60. There have been numerous attempts to establish international legal regimes for the
allocation and use of resources. See, e.g., Antarctic Treaty December 1, 1959, 402
U.N.T.S. 71; UNITED NATIONS THE LAW OF THE SEA: UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON
THE LAW OF THE SEA (U.N. Pub. Sales No.E. 83 v. 5 1982); (Agreement Governing the
Activities of Statas on the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, adopted General Assembly,
December 5, 1979 18 I.L.M. 1434 (1979)); (The instruments of the New International
Economic Order, the Declaration on Establishment of a New International Economic Order,
G.A. Res. 3201 (1974)); (The Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New
International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3202 (1974)); (the Charter of Economic Rights
and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281 (1974)).
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However, vague or imprecise prescription reflecting the lack of consensus
may lead to further disputes."
Another factor that cannot be ignored, but is difficult to weigh, is
the sociological one. One aspect of this sociological factor is the type of
people normally managing disputes on behalf of their state: bureaucrats,
diplomats, politicians, and lawyers, most of whom tend to be male and
relatively senior. Their behavior is molded by their training and social
expectations of their roles. This steers them toward certain established
patterns of conduct and arenas recognized by them. At this professional
level, national decision-making tends to be collegial and depersonalized.
However, the public decisions that bind the state to some course of action
may also be influenced by the personalities of their national leaders.'
The distinctive personalities of, for example, Qaddafi, Reagan, Khomeini,
Carter, Lange, Gorbachev, Thatcher, Bush, and Saddam Hussein cannot
be discounted. Each party's perceptions of its adversary may influence
the course of a dispute. If the leader of the other side of a dispute is seen
as a rational decision-maker, aiming at comprehensible objectives and
operating in a predictable fashion, the response is likely to be made in a
similar way. On the other hand, when an adversary is perceived as
irrational, fanatical, or megalomaniac, the reactions are likely to be
different.' There may also be situations in which acculturation leads to
blindness, preventing an awareness of the adversary's true character and
motives; one tends to interpret another's behavior through the lens of
one's own cultural paradigm. In all these situations, a third-party
facilitator, well-versed in cross-cultural perspectives, and sensitive to the
importance of personality, may be able to assist the dispute resolution
process.
61. Such is the case with the reliance upon equitable principles in the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea. See, e.g., art. 59, 74 and 83. Cf. Arbitration between
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic on the
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf (Tunisia-Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982 I.CJ. 18
(Feb. 24); Channel Islands Arbitration (U.K. v. Fr.), 18 I.L.M. 397, 421, 426-27 (1979)
(June 30, 1977).
62. See generally HAROLD D. LASsWELL, WORLD POLrICS AND PERSONAL
INSECURrrY (1965).
63. The subjective perception of both the adversary and the situation may weigh more
heavily than the reality acquired through objective analysis of the dispute. Cf. ROGER
FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTtATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING
IN 45-47 (1981) (continued detention of the United States hostages viewed from the
perspective of an Iranian student). See also Romana Sadurska, Threats of Force, 82 AM. J.
INT'L L. 239 n.30 (1988).
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V. STRATEGIES
Litigation is only one dispute resolution process and, even in
domestic arenas, is not the most frequently used, and certainly not the
most economic and cost-effective form of managing and containing
disputes. Other mechanisms are available for the settlement of
international disputes' that are non adversarial, do not occur in a public
judicial forum, and are not so clearly directed toward a win-lose outcome
of adjudication. Instead, they are directed towards formulating a
constructive, efficient, and lasting solution that addresses and targets the
substratum of a dispute and is acceptable to all participants. 6 The parties
assume responsibility for the process and its result, rather than channelling
the dispute into impersonal judicial machinery. Their success is
dependent upon the wide range of factors discussed in this Article.
Whichever strategies are pursued, every participant in an
acknowledged international dispute will attempt to rally support for its
position. This involves not only gathering the support of one's own
government, other governments, and the institutionalized international
community, but also the support of those who create and mold public
opinion: the international media, religious organizations, and other
influential bodies. To achieve this level of support, good communication
through diplomatic networking, reporting, and the gathering and
dissemination of intelligence is essential." Such effective communication
may have a number of consequences. On the one hand, it provides data
about the dispute; on the other hand, it may distort this information
through selective factual presentation, biased interpretation, and
propaganda.' These distortions are particularly obvious when the mass
media are state-controlled or biased in a particular dispute. The media
may in fact aggravate a dispute through inflammatory, jingoistic reporting;
it may even provoke an international dispute by reporting events the host
64. U.N. CHARTER art. 33 lists negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration
and resort to regional arrangements, in addition to adjudication.
65. There is an enormous amount of literature on dispute resolution processes in both
domestic and international law. For a useful summary, see STEVEN B. GOLDBERG, ERIC D.
GREEN & FRANK E. A. SANDER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1985 & Supp. 1987).
66. See Myres S. MeDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & W. Michael Reisman, The
Intelligence Function and World Public Order, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 365 (1973).
67. See generally B. S. MURTY, PROPAGANDA AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE
LEGAL REGULATION OF THE IDEOLOGICAL INSTRUMENT OF COERCION (1968).
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country may have preferred to keep secret, or at least low profile. 6' This
is, of course, a two-way process of continuous communication, its
monitoring, and its assessment. Another consequence of wide publicity
may be the loss of flexibility in handling the dispute. It may be hard for
a participant to retract from a position taken once stakes and values have
been publicly proclaimed to be basic and non-negotiable.
A. International Law as a Guide to the Appropriate Arena
The international law applicable to a dispute may be a relevant
factor in determining the appropriate arenas and processes available for a
dispute's resolution. For instance, when there is a jurisdictional or
arbitral clause, adjudication or arbitration are obvious possibilities.6 A
party may even make a Declaration under Article 36 of the Statute of the
International Court with impending litigation in mind, 0 or attempt to
retract or modify its declaration in order to avoid litigation!' When a
dispute may be construed as a threat to international peace and security,
the Security Council may become seized.' When regional security or
stability are perceived as being jeopardized, a regional organization may
be appropriate. When it appears certain to at least one protagonist that its
claim is legally well-founded, that may create a powerful incentive to
litigate rather than attempt another dispute resolution process which may
require compromise. The win-lose scenario of litigation may appear
attractive to the party who wishes to be vindicated. The American
hostages dispute is a good example of an expedient recourse to
adjudication. Because there was clear evidence of treaty violation and a
jurisdictional clause, it seemed worthwhile to the United States to seek a
favorable judicial ruling from the International Court, even though the
chances of enforcing any ruling were dubious from the outset.
Nonetheless, taking this step gave the United States greater legitimacy in
68. The wide international reporting of the prodemocracy movement in the People's
Republic of China in 1989 and the aftermath of its crushing by the People's Army ensured
response from other countries. The media have also ensured that the Intifadeh uprising
against the treatment of Palestinians in the occupied areas remains in the public eye.
69. For example, the first agreement in the Rainbow Warrior dispute following the
Secretary General's arbitration included an agreement to arbitrate any further dispute about
the application of the agreement. The parties used this method to resolve the subsequent
dispute over the premature return of the agents to metropolitan France.
70. For example, Nauru made a Declaration under article 36(2) on December 30, 1987
(1987-88) I.CJ.Y.B. 84 (1988) and filed an application against Australia in May 1989;
Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Aust.) 1989 I.C.J. 12 (July 18).
71. The United States so acted in April 1984, immediately before the filing of the
application by Nicaragua. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U. S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392 (Nov. 26).
72. U.N. CHARTER, chs. 6 & 7.
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resorting to other measures of self-help. Nicaragua pursued a similar
strategy in commencing litigation against the United States and,
encouraged by the outcome, continued this tactic against Honduras.7 It is
interesting that Costa Rica, which invested a lot of prestige in the peace
plan for Central America, settled the similar case brought against it by
Nicaragua. 74  At the other extreme, there were no apparent norms of
international law applicable to the Chernobyl nuclear accident, and
analogies could not easily be drawn from other areas of law. Further,
even without the uncertainty in the substantive law, there was no obvious
legal forum for the presentation of the dispute.
The applicable law in international disputes is frequently uncertain
and a party that estimates the odds are in its favor may be tempted to risk
adjudication because of the potential benefits of a favorable judgment. In
the early 1970s, the law on nuclear testing on the high seas was
equivocal, with strong arguments available for both sides. Australia and
New Zealand took advantage of the jurisdictional clause in the General
Act of 1928 and the existence of Declarations under Article 36(2) to
commence proceedings, while France resisted the Court's jurisdiction
because it could not afford to lose the case. The Court turned down a
possibility of stating the applicable law, perhaps realizing that whatever it
said would provoke further disputes.7S  This result casts doubt on the
usefulness of the law for the resolution of certain disputes.
These examples suggest that the availability of an international
judicial forum may not necessarily be effective for the resolution of
disputes, and may even be instrumental in causing escalation.
Conversely, lack of a judicial forum need not be disadvantageous for
resolving a dispute. For example, even if there was substantive law on
state liability for nuclear disaster, it is conceivable that a judicial finding
of liability against the Soviet Union would have made that country less
cooperative in taking active steps for the future international regulation of
its nuclear industry.
73. Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.), 1988 I.C.J. 69 (Dec.
20).
74. See Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Costa Rica) 1986 I.CJ. 548
(Oct. 21). The case was discontinued on August 19, 1987 after Nicaragua communicated to
the Court that it "discontinues the judicial proceedings instituted against Costa Rica.' This
was a result of the peace agreement of August 7, 1987 between five Central American
states. 1987-88 I.CJ.Y.B. 134 (1987). President Arias was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize
for his role in gaining the agreement.
75. Nuclear Tests (Austi. v. Fr.; N. Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 457 (Dec. 20).
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B. Forcible and Non-Forcible Self-Help
Participants may attempt to resolve their disputes through legal or
illegal methods, even if the latter violate the Charter, and thus bring the
perpetrator into a new dispute with the international community 76 Parties
using force will normally try to justify their actions in terms of
international law, claiming self-defense or other legitimate forms of the
use of force. Accepted justification may engender support from other
States and preempt sanctions against the perpetrator. On the other hand,
self-help always presents the danger that, while it may lead to a final
settlement of the dispute, it is just as likely to provoke its escalation.
Force polarizes third parties, invites force in response, heightens the
stakes in the dispute, and therefore, limits the use, and possibly the
effectiveness, of other dispute resolution processes. It has been argued
that the only possible role for violence in conflict resolution is when one
party has such a monopoly of power and force that it can impose its
desired settlement on the other.7 While such a settlement may restore
international peace and security, it may well not be just.
Self-help covers a wide spectrum of unilateral behavior (both
forcible and nonforcible) and motivations," not all of which are directed
at dispute resolution. For instance, the objective of self-help may be to
punish a perceived wrongdoer, to deter it from further wrongdoing or
from behavior perceived as harmful," or to retaliate for the wrongful act.
It may also serve the purpose of showing strength, as a warning, or to
bolster morale and satisfy domestic public opinion of the state resorting to
self-help.m In the dispute between Libya and the United States, all these
factors were present. The United States' air raid on Tripoli was ordered
to retaliate for the bombing of a West Berlin night club in which there
were American victims, to deter future terrorist activities, and to punish
76. In the present analysis, we are not concerned with the legality of self-help
measures, but only their impact upon resolution of the dispute.
77. See generally KENNETH BOULDING, CONFLICT AND DEFENSE (1962).
78. For example, self-help can be collective in form, but in reality unilateral in that one
State initiates the response. Some instances of self-help (individual or collective self-
defense) can be legitimate under U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
79. The Organization of East Caribbean States' sanctions against Grenada in October
1983 were not aimed at dispute resolution but at deterrence, as shown by the immediately
following intervention. On Grenada, see generally S. DAVIDSON, GRENADA: A STUDY IN
POLITICS AND THE LIMITs OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1987); WILLuAM C. GILMORE, THE
GRENADA INTERVENTION: ANALYSIS AND DOCUMENTATION (1984); Christopher C. Joyner,
The United States Action in Grenada, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 131 (1984); John N. Moore,
Grenada and the International Double Standard, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 145 (1984); Joseph H.
Weiler, Armed Intervention in a Dichotomized World: The Case of Grenada, in THE
CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 241 (A. Cassese ed. 1986).
80. Even in a state such as Sweden public opinion can push the government into the
use of force particularly if it becomes an electoral issue.
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Libyan sponsorship of international terrorism. It also satisfied American
public opinion, which was demanding strong action, and signalled that the
United States was prepared to strike against such wrongdoers. The
Americans may have also hoped that Libyan domestic opposition would
react against Qaddafi.3 '
In the Iran-Iraq war the prime objective of the use of force by both
parties seemed to be not so much to resolve the territorial issue as to
humiliate the adversary and to force its total capitulation. It developed
into a war of attrition in which a cease fire did not represent a resolution
of the dispute.2
Equally, any single instance of nonforcible self-help comprises
many forms of behavior with multiple, and often ambiguous, motives.
This was surely the case with the economic measures against the Soviet
Union after its invasion of Afghanistan, against Poland following the
imposition of martial law, and against Iran following the seizure of the
American hostages.Y In all these incidents, it appears the measures of
self-help were punitive, invocative, and tactical in attempting to induce
change. These goals may be convergent, but the means through which
they are implemented can be counterproductive. Putting coercive
economic pressure on the Soviet Union and Iran respectively did not
immediately lead to any obvious positive changes in the behavior of these
countries. Not only may economic sanctions be ineffective in resolving
the dispute, they may even backfire and cause loss to the imposer."
81. ROBIN MORGAN, THE DEMON LOVER, ON THE SEXUALITY OF TERRORISM 135
(1989). Morgan also cites Richard Falk, Thinking about Terrorism, NATION, June 28, 1986
at 886, as pointing out that the raid gave the Americans the opportunity "to test new weapon
systems and interventionary tactics." Id.
82. This dispute is remarkable for a number of reasons which cannot be fully discussed
in this paper: the situation in which the dispute developed; the initial international
community response, and its evolution due, inter alia, to the use of chemical weapons and
the escalation of the tanker war; the wide and various participants, including states,
international organizations, and the Kurds (a transboundary national minority group); the
roles of the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross; and the
problem of attrition as a form of dispute resolution. The onset of the Gulf War added
another twist to the relations between Iran and Iraq with Hussein conceding to Iran's claims
and Iran remaining formally neutral throughout the ensuing conflict.
83. See Higgins, Legal Responses to the Iranian and Afghan Crises, 74 AM. J. INT'L
L. 248 (1980); Patrick J. DeSouza, The Soviet Gas Pipeline Incident: Extension of
Collective Security Responsibilities to Peacetime Commercial Trade, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 92
(1984); Gary H. Perlow, Taking Peacetime Trade Sanctions to the Limit: the Soviet Pipeline
Embargo, 15 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 253 n.4 (1983); Margaret Doxey, International
Sanctions in Theory and Practice, 15 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 273 (1983).
84. Former President Ronald Reagan refused to suspend grain sales or the sale of high
technology items after the shooting of KAL 007; a suspension of grain sales would have
been against the wishes of United States farmers and would have occurred with an election
coming in 18 months; Bernard Gwerlzman, Reagan Avoids Dramatic in Response to
Shooting, N.Y. TIMES, September 6, 1983, at A15.
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Self-help could also be restorative by aiming at returning to the
status quo ante. Humanitarian intervention, as exemplified by the Israeli
rescue of hijacked hostages at Entebbe airport in June of 1976 and the
attempted United States military action in Iran, is an illustration of a
special kind of self-help with the limited purpose of saving threatened
lives. While these actions may finally lead to a resolution of the dispute,
that is not their prime goal; indeed, these actions may be a factor in the
eruption of a new dispute.
In other situations, self-help may be a direct factor in the causal
chain leading towards dispute resolution. For example, self-help may be
a coercive tactic designed either to put pressure on the adversary to
negotiate a settlement on favorable terms, or to submit to some other
recognized process of dispute resolution." Resort to force may also be
the expression of extreme frustration; for example, when one side realizes
that over a sustained period it has had no success with other methods and
perceives the adversary as unwilling either to take a constructive
approach" or to acknowledge its claims. By using force, the participant
attempts to make the opponent and the international community recognize
the urgency of its demands, although it runs the risk of having its actions
condemned as disproportionate and threatening to the maintenance of
stability. This was the reaction of the international community to
Hussein's use of armed force against Kuwait, which was the culmination
of a dispute between Iraq and Kuwait concerning long-standing territorial
claims, economic demands, and actions affecting the price of oil within
OPEC.u
Measures of self-help may also be a signal that benefits will be
restored in proportion to the target's willingness to cooperate and, thus,
can foster a climate for settlement. Self-help may be invocative of the
rule of international law that is threatened by the disputed behavior; its
ftnction in such a case is to prevent erosion of the rule, which may be an
objective standard by which the claims can be appraised. This was a
Swedish objective in its various reactions to the intrusions by Soviet
submarines. Similarly, one of the purposes of the sanctions imposed by
85. See, e.g., WILLIAM STEVENSON, 90 MINUTES AT ENTEBBE (1976); Francis S.
Boyle, The Entebbe Hostage Crisis, 29 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L.R. 32 (1982); Ted L. Stein,
Contempt, Crisis, and the Court. The World Court and the Hostage Rescue Attempt, 76
AM. J. INT'L L. 499 (1982); Anthea Jeffery, The American Hostages in Tehran: The ICI
and the Legality of Rescue Missions, 30 INT'L & COM. L. Q. 717 (1981).
86. Compare the United States' coercive economic action designed to induce France to
speed up the arbitration of an aviation dispute. Lori F. Damrosch, Retaliation or Arbitration
- or Both? 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 785, 797-802 (1980).
87. There may have been a measure of such frustration in the outbreak of hostilities in
both the Falklands-Malvinas and Iran-Iraq conflicts.
88. See M. BOOKES, BACKGROUND TO THE GULF WAR (1991).
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members of the European communities against Argentina was to indicate
their condemnation of Argentina's use of force to assert territorial
claims."
C. Global and Regional Organizations
Global and regional organizations provide forums and mechanisms
for the resolution of disputes. The United Nations' dispute resolution role
is formally limited by its primary purpose, which is the maintenance of
international peace and security. Therefore, the United Nations is
competent to step in when the Security Council, under Article 39, or the
General Assembly, under the Uniting for Peace Resolution, 90 defines a
dispute as a breach of the peace, a threat to the peace, or an act of
aggression. States are not, however, precluded from referring a dispute
likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security to
the United Nations without such a determination. The combined effect of
Chapters 6 and 7 and Article 27(3) of the U.N. Charter is two-fold: the
United Nations might not become seized of a dispute that is not deemed
likely to endanger international peace and security, and even serious
disputes may be excluded for lack of consensus in the Security Council."
These limitations do not necessarily obstruct the United Nations' role
when the political climate encourages the organization's active
involvement in a particular dispute, as occurred in the months following
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The Soviet Union was troubled by internal
unrest and economic problems, China was seeking to restore its
international reputation after the events of June 1989, which provided
unanimity in the Security Council and enabled a collective response to the
invasion.9'  For many participants, the use of the United Nations'
resources and expertise will be the most economical way of handling a
dispute.
Formal resolutions of both the Security Council and the General
Assembly characteristically stress the need to cool the dispute and to
diffuse the crisis without addressing the grievances of the parties.
89. June 1982: The Falkland Islands and European Community Solidarity, 7 EUR.
L.R. 1, 45 (1982). All members of the European Communities imposed an arms embargo
on Argentina, and all, except Italy and Eire, agreed on economic sanctions.
90. G.A. Res. 377 (1950).
91. There is a possibility of the escalation of a dispute within the United Nations when
a dispute over its jurisdiction or the jurisdiction of its organs arises.
92. See, e.g., Security Council Res. 660, Aug. 2, 1990; Security Council Res. 661,
Aug. 6, 1990 (introducing economic sanctions); Security Council Res. 678, Nov. 28, 1990
(authorizing Member States to use "all necessary means" to uphold and implement the earlier
Resolutions).
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Therefore, they call for such measures as a cease fire, the withdrawal of
foreign troops, the restoration of taken territory, or the return of hostages,
and for the parties to enter into negotiations, while other members of the
international community are urged to refrain from aggravating the
situation. In extreme cases, the United Nations can establish
peacekeeping forces to, for example, oversee a cease-fire,3 to interpose
between belligerents, or to maintain law and order in disputed areas.94
Not only do U.N. resolutions tend not to address the real disputed
issues, but they also refrain from labelling either party as a wrongdoer.
Such a label may prejudge the legality of the actions and may be
counterproductive to dispute resolution. 9s However, when there is no
adverse political obstacle to denoting a State as being in violation of
international law, the institutional decisions may go further and impose
sanctions upon the wrongdoer, as is the case with South Africa and Iraq.6
The objectives of the sanctions imposed in the case of South Africa are:
(1) to invoke the illegality of apartheid under international law; (2) to
force the South African government to comply with international norms;
(3) to subvert the existing socio-political system in South Africa; (4) to
prevent further repression of the black population in South Africa; and
(5) to provide support for the front-line African nations. While some of
these objectives could be realized by a mere call for sanctions, many
assert that the wider goals can only be achieved through a universally
accepted embargo on trade and finance. Collective sanctions may,
however, prolong a dispute by entrenching and strengthening the target's
resolve; thus, the limitations of collective sanctions as a dispute resolution
process may occasionally be similar to those discussed in the context of
self-help."7 Failure by Iraq to comply with the demands of the Security
93. For the United Nations' treatment of the Iran-Iraq war, see 24 U.N. CHRONICLE
No. 4, Ig (1987); 25 U.N. CHRONICLE No. 4, 21 (1988).
94. Such a situation existed in Cyprus after the 1974 invasion by Turkey. UNFICYP
was originally established by the Security Council in 1964 when fighting between Greek and
Turkish Cypriots broke out.
95. It had just the opposite consequence in the Iran-Iraq conflict: Iran refused to accept
Security Council Resolution 598 because Iraq was not labelled an aggressor. Iran called the
Resolution "an unjust and partial resolution" because it favored Iraq despite the latter's
aggression against Iran. Iran claimed that Security Council Resolution 479 calls upon Iran
"to practically submit to aggression." 26 I.L.M. 1479 (1980).
96. In Security Council Res. 660, Aug. 2, 1990, the Security Council condemned the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as an action which constituted a breach of international peace and
security under U.N. Charter Art. 39 and which justified the initiation of sanctions by
Security Council Res. 661, Aug. 6, 1990.
97. Collective sanctions authorized by the United Nations could conceivably even widen
the dispute. Imagine that certain members of the United Nations proposed to extend
sanctions to Israel for its involvement in providing arms to South Africa. Such a proposal
would almost certainly engender a dispute within the United Nations due to objections from
the United States and others.
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Council Resolutions 660 and 661 provides an example of the limited
effectiveness of economic sanctions. Even when the Security Council
avoids taking a stance on a dispute and refuses to apportion blame, it may
still provide a forum for debate and may be used to embarrass a
perpetrator and its sponsors in the Security Council."3 In some cases, the
General Assembly may not be so reluctant to take up the issue as the
Security Council, thus keeping it on the international agenda and
reminding the international community of the unresolved disputes.'
Article 99 of the U.N. Charter gives the Secretary General only a very
limited dispute resolution role, yet the Secretariat has proved to be the
most active and creative body within the United Nations for this function.
The Secretary General typically pursues missions of good offices and
initiates diplomatic efforts for the promotion of the peaceful settlement of
disputes. Admittedly, recourse to these services and their subsequent
efficacy depends, as always, on a favorable political climate. In the
disputes examined, the Secretary General performed a range of functions:
fact-finding in the hostage crisis and in the Iran-Iraq war; engaging in
diplomatic processes throughout the Afghanistan dispute, and eventually
acting as an intermediary in the Geneva Conferences leading to the peace
agreements; acting as a mediator and arbitrator in the Rainbow Warrior
incident; and pursuing diplomatic exchanges between the United Kingdom
and Argentina in attempts to persuade them to resume negotiations after
the end of the Falklands War.
Chapter 8 of the Charter encourages regional organizations to
supplement its dispute resolution procedures. The participation of
regional organizations in a dispute can allow member States to take sides
and act collectively, without becoming so vulnerable to adverse
consequences that might follow individual responses.'"° Disputing states
may resort to regional organizations either because a dispute is regional in
98. For example, the Western powers attempted to exploit the issue of the shooting
down of KAL 007 and to embarrass the Soviet Union. Japan and the Republic of Korea
requested a meeting of the Security Council which took place in September 1983. It had
been hoped that there would be strong condemnation of the Soviet Union, but only a weaker
resolution was accepted when Malta decided to vote in favor. While the debate may have
embarrassed the Soviet Union it also put the United States in an unfavorable light for its
actions in encouraging condemnation when the facts were still unclear. See U.N.
CHRONICLE, 20-31 (1983); DAVID E. PEARSON, KAL 007: THE COVER UP (1987).
99. For the resolutions concerning Afghanistan, see G.A. Res. ES-6/2 (XXXV),
January 14, 1980 (adopted 104-18 with 18 abstentions); G.A. Res. 38/7 (XXXvm),
November 2, 1983.
100. For example, the European Communities made a collective statement against
Libya on January 28, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 207 (1986). This may reflect lessons learned from
the 1973 oil embargo, during which individual states that had made unilateral statements
were targeted by terrorists.
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character,"0' or because a member of the region is in dispute with an
outsider and desires an expression of regional support. 0 Alternatively,
the members may bring the dispute before the organization even against
the wishes of the involved states." States in the region might fear that
involvement of the United Nations with invocation of universal law and
principles might be detrimental to their regional interests. °4 This may be
a considerable cost to regional states and may even thwart the resolution
process, as poorer organizations may not be able to provide the necessary
infrastructure."'
The existence of a regional organization may provoke a regional
dispute when it intervenes in the internal affairs of a member. State."6
Outside the established institutional frameworks, specific disputes may
give rise to ad hoc regional responses based on a regional, cultural, or
religious solidarity and members' shared interests in the resolution of the
dispute.t 7 Special interest organizations may also take an active role in
the resolution of a dispute that touches on their concerns. The interest
may be economic, religious, ethnic, or ideological. For example, a
number of such organizations debated the Iran-Iraq war and offered their
good offices and economic incentives to end the conflict. 0 Similarly,
101. The Organization of African Unity played an active role in the Libya-Chad
conflict by organizing negotiations, by foring ad hoc committees to assist the parties, and
by supplying peace-keeping forces. Such services are costly for many African states. See
1980 INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN AFRICA: OAU 5759-60, 5822-23; 1981
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN AFRICA: OAU 6066-67, 6274-76. For the
situation in Chad, see 88 R.G.D.I.P. 288 (1984); 89 R.G.D.I.P. 477 (1985). On August
31, 1990 the two countries submitted their territorial dispute to the International Court of
Justice; Press Communique, 1990 I.C.J. 14 (Sept. 4); Press Communique, 1990 I.C.J. 17(Nov. 7).
102. For example, Argentina rallied the support of the Organization of American States
in the Falklands-Malvinas conflict. See Tina A. Lamoreaux, United States Obligations
Under the OAS Charter and the Rio Treaty: An Analysis of the Falkland Islands Crisis, 13
CAL. WEST INT'L LJ. 493 (1983); Domingo E. Acevedo, The U.S. Measures against
Argentina Resulting from the Malvinas Conflict, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 323 (1984).
103. Such was the case in the meetings of the Organization of East Caribbean States
over the invasion of Grenada.
104. Although the Chad-Libya dispute was brought before the Security Council on two
occasions at the request of Chad, the United Nations had little to do with the resolution of
the dispute, which was kept primarily within Africa through the OAU and within the Non-
Aligned Movement. On the OAU as a dispute resolution body, see T.O. Elias, The
Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration of the Organisation of African Unity,
40 Y.B.B.I.L. 336 (1964).
105. For example, in the Chad-Libya dispute, Sudan attempted to act as a mediator
under the auspices of the OAU, but limited resources made it ineffective.
106. For example, in Grenada there was no international dispute until the intervention.
The consequent removal of the Revolutionary Military Council meant there was subsequently
no one to express the claims of the state. This again illustrates the statist bias of
international law and the gaps created by the identification of a state through its government.
107. For example, the Contadora process in disputes in Central America.
108. Such organizations included the Islamic Conferences, the Non-Aligned Movement,
the Arab League, and the Gulf Corporation Council.
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organizations and individuals within the Arab world attempted to facilitate
the resolution of the dispute between Iraq and Kuwait both before and
after the invasion of Kuwait.
D. Negotiation and Third-Party Intermediaries
There are various models of international negotiations. Although it
is not necessary for the purpose of this Article to identify all of them, it
may be useful to single out the main pattems. 109  An international
negotiation is a process aimed at mutual problem-solving and reaching a
joint settlement acceptable to all parties. Determining the appropriate
parties for the negotiations out of all the participants in a dispute is itself
important for the outcome. For instance, in the early 1970s, Iceland
refused to participate in multi-party negotiations with the various claimants
to fishing rights in its declared zones. It preferred to deal with each State
separately in order to avoid the pressure of numbers against it, and to
forestall any possibility of contributing to a prescriptive process likely to
prejudice its claims."'
Through negotiations, parties may achieve a convergence through
gradual identification of interests and a process of concession-making to
reach a compromise. Whether a settlement is achieved depends on the
elements discussed previously, and in particular, the eventual willingness
of the parties to balance their claims in a package agreement. The term
"package deal" is usually applied to treaty negotiation rather than dispute
settlement;... however, the similarity of this particular form of outcome is
not surprising considering the interlocking of prescriptive and dispute
resolution processes.
While a process of negotiations can be entered into and conducted
formally, the prevailing reality of international negotiation is the constant
sending of public and private messages and the testing of positions in a
process of verbal and nonverbal communications. The purposes of such
communications are multiple and are not always consciously formulated,
let alone conducive, to dispute resolution. They may be preparatory to
more defined resolution processes and may define claims and bargaining
109. See generally ORAN R. YOUNG, THE INTERMEDIARIES: THIRD PARTIES IN
INTERNATIONAL CRISES (1967).
110. The same tactic was followed in the International Court of Justice, where Iceland
did not consent to joinder of the applications by the United Kingdom and West Germany.
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. v. Ice.) 1974 I.C.J. 3, 5-6; Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (W.
Ger. v. Iceland), 1974 I.C.J. 175, 177. Similarly, Nicaragua preferred to commence
separate proceedings in the International Court of Justice against the United States,
Honduras, and Costa Rica.
111. For example, the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea.
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positions. They may also be used to try to force the adversary to
respond, a pressure it may resist. Communications of this sort form a
backdrop to all negotiatory processes. "2
When the parties refuse to meet to negotiate, or they cannot find a
common ground for negotiations for whatever reason, use of a third-party
intermediary may be helpful." Their willingness to involve a third party
may not be indicative of the chances of a successful outcome, but at the
very least, signifies that their positions are not necessarily intransigent.
From the perspective of dispute resolution, the three crucial aspects of
third-party intervention are the choice of the third party, the timing of the
mediation, and the functions ascribed to that third party.
Trust and a willingness to listen are essential for successful
negotiations and can be fostered by skillful mediators. When a mediator
is considered or perceived as biased, or having a personal or private
agenda, mediation is unlikely to work. The role of Algeria, in achieving
the release of the United States hostages in January of 1981, illustrates all
three factors. When Algeria offered its services, there were good reasons
for both sides to accept. From the Iranian point of view, Algeria was an
Islamic nation with a history of anti-colonial struggle that had previously
assisted Iran in resolving a dispute.114 The United States had strong trade
links with Algeria and trusted the familiarity of the Algerian elite with
Western legal and political culture. To both states, Algeria must have
appeared an impartial and reliable third party which was willing and able
to commit sizeable resources and remarkable expertise to the task. as The
lack of a political and economic infrastructure practically eliminates small,
112. The international negotiation process has been widely analyzed. See OTOMAR J.
BARTOS, SIMPLE MODEL OF NEGOTIATIONS: A SOCIOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW IN THE
NEGOTIATION PROCESS, 13-27 (I.W. Zartman ed. 1978); FREDERICK C. IKLE, How
NATIONS NEGOTIATE (1981); ARTHUR S. LALL, MODERN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION:
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE (1966); MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION 183
(Arthus S. Lall ed. 1985); PAUL R. PILLAR, NEGOTIATING PEACE: WAR TERMINATION AS
A BARGAINING PROCESS (1983); Lloyd Jensen, Soviet-American Bargaining Behavior in
Post-War Disannament Negotiations, 7 J. CONFLICT REs. No. 3, 522 (1963).
113. There is no single definition of the terms mediation, conciliation, good offices,
and other forms of third-party intervention. They are fluid processes that depend upon the
tasks entrusted to the third party and that third party's implementation of them. Their
strength as dispute resolution processes is that they can be adapted to the needs of the
particular participants. For discussion of the processes, see STEVEN B. GOLDBERG, ERIC D.
GREEN & FRANK E. A. SANDER, DISPUTE RFSOLUTION (1985 & Supp. 1987).
114. Algeria was instrumental in achieving the 1975 Algeria Accord. Rule 20.4.5(b)
June 13, 1975, Iran-Iraq, 1017 U.N.T.S. 54, State Frontier and Neighboring Relations
between Iran and Iraq. Iran was more satisfied with the outcome than Iraq, which felt the
Treaty had, to some extent, been imposed upon it.
115. Algeria followed the rest of the world in condemning the taking of hostages but
recognized its place in the wider situation. Algeria provided, for several months, the
personal services of its top diplomatic and financial experts, who travelled between the
parties and requested no recompense. Reportedly, they seemed to be poorly thanked for
their travails.
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poor countries from performing those functions. Thus, negotiation favors
the use of better developed countries and promotes their influence as
intermediaries in dispute resolution. It may also mean that the resolution
of various disputes best suits their interests.
Earlier attempts at negotiated settlement between Iran and the
United States had failed, but changes in the situation made the intervention
of a third-party intermediary possible in the autumn of 1980 and
eventually successful in securing the release of the hostages in January of
1981. The commencement of the Iran-Iraq war in September of 1980 had
brought home to Iran how vulnerable its diplomatic isolation had made it;
the forthcoming American elections raised the possibility of a new,
tougher administration; and, the Khomeini regime had sufficiently
consolidated its domestic power not to have to use the detention of the
hostages as a popular rallying point. Furthermore, the earlier efforts of a
third-party intermediary (the West German government) had prepared the
ground by eliminating non-negotiable issues from the agenda.
Algeria's role went beyond the traditional functions of an
intermediary. It apparently established full and effective communications
between the parties by transmitting proposals and counterproposals, by
refusing to transmit ultimatums, and by explaining the respective legal and
political cultures and institutions. In effect, its representatives acted as
"cultural interpreters," and by reality-testing proposed solutions, offered
their own suggestions. They used confidence-building techniques such as
independently verifying processes for the transfer of assets,n 6 arranging
medical examinations of the hostages, and organizing security forces in
Tehran. Their position as intermediary created a face-saving process for
both parties, the culmination of which was the settlement in the form of a
Declaration of the Government of Algeria.117
Another example highlights the potential benefits of mediation.
Argentina and Chile, in their territorial dispute over the Beagle Channel,
found recourse to mediation under the auspices of the Vatican1 more
116. Taken alone, a fact-finding mission does not constitute a dispute resolution
process, but an objective fact-finding mission may facilitate the progress of other processes,
such as negotiation or mediation. The functions of objective fact-finding as a dispute
resolution process can be illustrated further through an examination of the United Nations
Mission in Kampuchea in 1989 and its investigations of the use of chemical weapons in the
Iran-Iraq war. See 25 U.N. CHRONICLE No. 2, p. 57; 25 U.N. CHRONICLE No. 3, p. 40
(1988).
117. Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria
Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 20 I.L.M. 224 (1981).
118. Charles Rousseau, Argentine el Chili. Etat Actuel de la Question du Canal de
Beagle, 85 R.G.D.I.P. 538 (1981). The process was mediation, but the outcome was a
package proposed by the third party which had to be accepted or rejected in total. In this
sense, it was more like an arbitration. However, the proposals included demilitarization of
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satisfactory than their earlier arbitration with judges of the International
Court acting as arbitrators.1 9 Although Argentina initially accepted
neither decision, changes in the background situation by 19 8 4 made
Argentina amenable to signing the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, which
resolved the question of sovereignty of the islandstm Argentina had
finally agreed to accept a very similar solution to that contained in the
arbitral award. What elements of mediation had made that process more
acceptable? Argentina may have felt that the mediation process had
allowed its geopolitical arguments to be fully expressed and its interests to
be fully considered by the mediator, unlike the arbitration, which relied
on narrow legal reasoning and left little room for extralegal realities.
Perhaps this is not surprising given the judicial background of the
arbitrators and mediation's unique emphasis on the choice of the third
party. The fact that the mediator was the Holy See gave its proposals
special authority with the two Catholic countries. Further, the
representative chosen by the Pope was well qualified to deal with this
dispute; he had been papal ambassador to Colombia and was highly
regarded as the Vatican expert on South American affairs.
E. International Arbitration
International arbitration takes place in interstate ad hoc tribunals
and international commercial arbitral tribunals. Despite the conclusion of
many treaties providing for arbitration in the event of a dispute,
m
arbitration is seldom used and seems ineffective for resolving disputes.
One reason may be a certain degree of confusion about the proper role of
arbitration: is it negotiatory or adjudicative?m  Moreover, arbitration is
perceived as unpredictable because the parties have no control over the
process or outcome once they have submitted their dispute to the
the disputed zone, and that the parties conclude a Treaty of Perpetual Friendship,
requirements making the mediation package very different from a legalistic arbitral award.
This illustrates the flexibility of these processes and the importance of determining what
third party role the parties are prepared to accept.
119. 17 I.L.M. 738 (1978); David M. Himmelreich, The Beagle Channel Affair: A
Failure in Judicial Persuasion, 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 971 (1979).
120. For example, the defeat in the Falkland Island war, the ensuing fall of the military
junta, and the return to civilian government.
121. 24 I.L.M. 1 (1985).
122. See United Nations Systematic Survey for the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes 1928-1948 (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 1949).
123. Cf. J.L. SIMPSON & HAZEL Fox, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 3 (1959), which
asserts that arbitrators in mixed arbitral commissions *act to some extent as negotiators
rather than as judges, to temper justice with diplomacy, to give a measure of satisfaction to
both sides, for example, in a territorial dispute." Argentina, in the Beagle Channel dispute,
appears to have seen the first arbitration as too judicial.
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arbitrators. The outcome may also be perceived as biased; the common
practice of each party appointing one arbitrator highlights the suspicion
with which the other will be regarded.'x When the adjudication model is
preferred, parties appear more inclined to submit a case by special
agreement to the International Court and take advantage of the full judicial
process, more recently through constitution of a Special Chamber of the
Court.'2 The decision of the Court in the Gulf of Maine case, that parties
may select judges from the full bench, encourages the resort to the
International Court rather than to ad hoc arbitration. 26  On the other
hand, various statistics confirm that international commercial arbitration is
thriving.' 7  The inclusion of various model arbitral rulesm  and their
incorporation into domestic law,m the wide participation in the New York
Convention on the Enforcement and Recognition of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, m and the enormous increase in the number and complexities of
international transactions are several reasons supporting the growth of
arbitration. Another indication of this trend is the growing number of
arbitrations under the auspices of the International Center for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes."' The finality of an arbitral award is
especially significant from the perspective of dispute resolution, as it is
124. There have been notorious disagreements between the Iranian and American
arbitrators on the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal at The Hague.
125. Statute of the International Court, art. 26. The Court has acceded to the request
for a special Chamber in Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hon.), 1987
I.C.J. 10 (May 8); Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1987 I.C.J. 185 (Nov.
17); Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali), 1985 I.C.J. 6 (Apr. 3).
126. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, (Can.-U.S.)
1982 I.C.J. 3 (Jan. 20).
127. The number of international commercial arbitrations heard under the ICC rules in
the decade 1976-1986 virtually equalled the number of cases for the preceding 53 years.
International Chamber of Commerce: New Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration, 28 I.L.M.
231, 233 (1989). In 1988, there were II cases pending before the ICSID, more than at any
time before. Ibrahim F.I. Shinata, Introduction by the Secretary-General, ICSID Ann. Rep.,
4 (1988).
128. See, e.g., United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, June 21, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1302
(1985).
129. On June 17, 1986, Canada became the first common law State to implement the
UNCrIRAL Model Law into domestic law. Canada: Legislation to Implement the United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and
Legislation on International Commercial Arbitration, 26 I.L.M. 714 (1987). Other States
have done likewise. See, e.g., Republic of Djibouti Code of International Arbitration, Feb.
13, 1984, 25 I.L.M. 1 (1986); Netherlands: New Statute on Arbitration, July 2, 1986, 26
I.L.M. 921 (1987); The International Arbitration Amendment Act (Cth) 1989, No. 25 of
1989, incorporates the UNCITRAL Model Law into Australian law. The Law Reform
Commission of Hong Kong recommended in August 1987 that Hong Kong follow suit and
New Zealand is considering similar action.
130. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, New
York, June 10, 1958.
131. See generally Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States
and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159; 4 I.L.M. 532 (1965).
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clear that when awards are challenged, for whatever reason, the
effectiveness of the process is subverted and the usefulness of arbitration
becomes questionable. 32
The United States-Iran Tribunal forms a bridge between these two
types of arbitration. Its adoption was part of the resolution of an inter
State dispute while its jurisdiction includes commercial disputes between
individuals of different states.m To this end, it incorporates and adopts
the UNCITRAL Model Rules. In the United States-Iran dispute,
arbitration was the politically acceptable means of managing the numerous
individual commercial claims arising out of the Iranian Revolution's
disruption of contractual relationships. One may speculate as to why a
lump sum settlement was not preferred over arbitration of individual
claims, given the widespread practice.0 4
A lump sum settlement would probably have been favored by
American claimants, as it would have been administered by their own
government. One possibility is that, in a dispute that raised such strong
emotions of national pride and impacted upon national prestige and
internal politics, neither party wished to be seen publicly as admitting
wrong through the payment of a large sum of money to the other.
Further, in this dispute, the release of assets had become central to the
resolution in almost the same way as the freeing of the hostages.
Payment of compensation in satisfaction of an impartial tribunal's award
tends to diffuse the stigma of state responsibility. The claim changes its
flavor from the highly emotive allegation of national wrongdoing, causing
damage to aliens, to a commercial breach of contract. The awards are
handed down long after the initial glare of publicity has passed and
domestic awareness of the Tribunal's findings is lessened.
If this analysis has any validity, it was probably more conducive to
the Iranians to accept arbitration. Moreover, the exclusion from the
Tribunal's jurisdiction of claims arising out of revolutionary acts, which is
contrary to the usual principles of state responsibility, was a further
132. This is becoming an increasing problem within ICSID. E.g., Jurisdiction of
Tribunal, 27 I.L.M. 1281 (1988); Application for Annulment Submitted by the Republic of
Indonesia, 25 I.L.M. 1441 (1986); Amco v. Republic of Indon. (Arb/81/l) 24 I.L.M. 1023
(1985). Cf Switzerland: Decisions of the Court of Justice of Geneva and the Federal
Tribunal (Excerpts) Concerning Award in Westland Helicopters Arbitration (Annulment of
Award with respect to Egypt), 28 I.L.M. 687 (1989). The same is true with inter-State
arbitration, as exemplified by the Beagle Channel and Guyana-Venezuela arbitral awards. In
1989, The Republic of Guinea-Bissau initiated proceedings against The Republic of Senegal
with respect to the validity of an arbitral award of July 31, 1989 on maritime boundary
delimitation, 1989 I.C.J. 4.
133. See CHRISTINE D. GRAY, JUDICIAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 178-85
(1987).
134. See generally RICHARD B. LILLICH & BURNS H. WESTON, INTERNATIONAL
CLAIMS: THEIR SETTLEMENT BY LUMP SUM AGREEMENTS, pts. 1 & 2 (1975).
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advantage for them. However, the Tribunal must have appeared less
attractive to American claimants who had already commenced actions in
the United States courts and, consequently, claimed the settlement to be
unconstitutional. This raised the question of the impact of domestic law
upon international dispute resolution.us Even if claims adjudicated in
American courts could have been satisfied from a fund in a foreign bank
(as is the case with the United States-Iran Tribunal), they would have
been politically unacceptable to the Iranians. The need for the American
government to secure the release of the hostages ensured its compromise
on this matter. The establishment and operation of the United States-Iran
Tribunal illustrates the polycentric nature of international disputes, with
the presenting issue being only the tip. The detention of the hostages was
the focal point of the dispute, but many other issues were also disputed by
the countries and needed to be taken into account in the settlement.
Further, the agreement between the states reduced the freedom of action
of individuals, even those individuals who were the most immediate
participants in the dispute.
F. Adjudication of International Disputes
Adjudication is also inherently limited as a method of international
dispute resolution. Its main preoccupation is with the allocation of
existing legal rights and duties between the parties, but a dispute
articulated in this fashion may be part of a wider situation with which the
International Court is not equipped to deal. In this sense, a judicial ruling
cannot effectively resolve the dispute. It is the importance of the
distinction between a dispute and a situation that makes necessary the
analysis of the origins, causes, and participants of international disputes.
The prime illustration of a dispute in which one participant attempted to
reduce a wider situation to legal concepts, and to make claims in the first
instance against just one other participant, is the litigation between
Nicaragua and the United States. 37 The case also exemplifies the need for
135. See, e.g., Dames v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). The claimants were
unsuccessful.
136. No claims (including those of the hostages themselves) could be brought in any
court other than the Tribunal. Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and
Popular Republic of Algeria, Nullification of Sanctions and Claims, q 11; Declaration of the
Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, Concerning the Settlement
of Claims by the Government of the United States and the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, art. 2 q 1.
137. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Request for provisional measures, these must be in to distinguish two judgments. 1984
I.C.J. 169 (May 10); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, (Nicar.
v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
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the identification of participants in a multilateral dispute, in order to
determine who are the appropriate parties before the Court and the
characterization of the situation in which the claims arise, for the purpose
of deciding their admissibility.
The factual context of Nicaragua's claims against the United
States, and subsequently Honduras,m provides an eloquent contrast to the
American hostages dispute. The American hostages dispute was a clear-
cut bilateral dispute presenting no state party problem before the Court. 9
The Nicaraguan claim was far more complex. Central America was the
stage for various allegations of military intervention and counter-
intervention between the states of the region, with the United States
actively supporting forces hostile to the Nicaraguan government. The
conflict evidently was not a bilateral dispute, as presented by Nicaragua
and accepted by the Court. The United States fought this
characterization,' supporting El Salvador's request to intervene and, after
the rejection of that request, 4 arguing that the latter was an indispensable
party without which proceedings could not continue.", El Salvador's
evidence was essential to the United States' claim of collective self-
defense. The Court had the power to allow El Salvador access to the
proceedings.. but refused to do so, possibly being apprehensive about the
transformation of a bilateral dispute into multi-party proceedings of which
it had little experience. Yet, in reality, this refusal by the Court
transformed the multi-party dispute into a formal bilateral framework.
The Court also had power to refuse to hear the case in the absence of El
Salvador.' 44 Nevertheless, the Court went ahead in adjudicating only a
part of the overall dispute and, thus, jeopardized the effectiveness of its
judgment as a dispute resolution tool. This was further exposed by
138. See Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.), 1988 I.C.J. 69
(Dec. 20).
139. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, (U.S. v. Iran), 1980
I.CJ. 3 (May 24).
140. The United States argued that the Court had no jurisdiction. When the Court
rejected this argument in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua,
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. Rep. 392 (Judgment of Nov. 26), the United States refused to
participate in the hearing on the merits. United States Dep't of State, Statement on the U.S.
Withdrawal from the Proceedings initiated by Nicaragua in the International Court of Justice,
January 18, 1985 24 I.L.M. 246 (1985).
141. Declaration of Intervention, 1984 I.C.J. 215 (Order of Oct. 4).
142. See LoRi F. DAMROSCH, Multilateral Disputes in the International Court of
Justice, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADs 376 (1987).
143. El Salvador sought access as an intervenor under art. 62 or 63 of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice or to give evidence before it. The Court asserted that the
intervention was premature, and that another request at the merits stage would be accepted.
144. See Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. Fr., U.K. of Gr. Brit.
and N. Ir. and U.S.), Preliminary Question, 1954 I.C.J. 19 (June 15) (possible application
of indispensable party concept).
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Nicaragua's subsequent case against Honduras, which amounts to a second
round of the same dispute.
The same predilection to distill the narrow legal dispute from the
wider situation led the International Court to reject claims of
inadmissibility based on the alleged political character of the dispute.14 In
the hostages case, Iran claimed in a letter that the Court "cannot and
should not take cognizance of the case" as submitted by the United States
government and confined to the detention of the hostages. "For this
question only represents a marginal and secondary aspect of an overall
problem, one such that it cannot be studied separately. . . ."'1 Ironically,
in its dispute with Nicaragua, the United States argued, inter alia, that
ongoing disputes concerning the use of force are not appropriate for
adjudication, but rather should be dealt with by political processes.
Both Iran and the United States refused to defend their actions
before the Court.' 7 The nonappearing defendant creates another problem
for the effectiveness of adjudication as a method of dispute resolution,
except where there is a special agreement to submit a clearly defined
dispute to it.' 4  By concluding a special agreement defining the
parameters of the dispute and accepting their role as parties, the
participants go a fair way towards settling the dispute. It is significant
that by the time a dispute is ready for adjudication, the parties have
assessed the possible outcomes and decided that they can afford the risk of
an adverse decision.' 49  This emphasizes that the Court offers major
assistance in dispute resolution by making authoritative legal decisions
concerning the parties' rights and duties.
Submission to the judicial forum may serve a useful purpose even
when jurisdiction is contested. Going to the International Court shows
that a party is serious about the dispute and is taking substantial active
steps to satisfy its own public. When the Court decides that it has
145. See Edward Gordon, Discretion to Decline to Exercise Jurisdiction (Harold G.
Maier ed.), 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 129 (1987).
146. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, (U.S. v. Iran), Merits,
1980 I.C.J. 3, 8 (May 24).
147. Iran participated in no phase of the proceedings, except for communicating with
the Court by letter. See JEROME B. ELKIND, NON-APPEARANCE BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (1985).
148. Id. at 73-77; See generally H.W.A. THIRLWAY, NON-APPEARANCE BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (1985).
149. The classic scenario for submission by special agreement is maritime boundary
delimitation; see e.g., Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J. 18
(Feb. 24); Continental Shelf (Libyan/Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13 (June 3); North
Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20).
Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.); 1974 I.C.J. 3, 31-32 (July 25), constitutes a striking
refusal to accept jurisdiction by a special agreement in a hope to settle such matters. Iceland
could not afford the risk of adverse judgement and refused to appear before the Court. Cf.
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.) 1978 I.C.J. 3 (Dec. 19).
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jurisdiction (as in the disputes the United States had with Nicaragua and
Iran), it can clarify some aspects of the dispute by judging the legitimacy
of the claims. This may help to rally the international community behind
the aggrieved party, which in turn can put pressure on the other party to
resolve the dispute by other means. Without the Court's condemnation of
the seizure of the hostages, the United States might have found it more
difficult to gain widespread international support. By contrast, Iran found
itself internationally isolated until it released the hostages. This isolation
was particularly harmful to its interests at the commencement of the Iran-
Iraq war, which added a new dimension to the dispute with the United
States. However, when the Court refuses to give this help, either by
calling on the parties to negotiate m or finding that there is no dispute
between these particular parties,s it plays no practical role in dispute
resolution. In the context of a dispute, this refusal to accept jurisdiction
may be detrimental or absurd; however, from the point of view of the
Court, it may be defensible as a means of preserving its authority.
To a certain degree, use of the domestic judicial forum for
international dispute resolution, when it is available, presents similar
problems. In the Rainbow Warrior affair, recourse to the New Zealand
judicial system against the French agents may have exacerbated the
dispute by presenting and adjudging the French criminal actions in a
public forum. However, adjudication was not completely counter-
productive. Because, in New Zealand, the ruling of the criminal court
could not be challenged as subservient to the executive will, the ruling
served as an additional legitimation of New Zealand's claim. It was also
politically necessary for the New Zealand public to see the government
deal firmly with the matter.
Exclusionary doctrines, however, such as the act of state doctrine,
which are applied by domestic courts in, inter alia the United States, the
United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, may result in international
disputes not being addressed in domestic judicial forums.'2 One of the
justifications for this judicial restraint is that such matters are inherently
outside judicial knowledge, and that the judiciary should not interfere with
the executive function. It might be that the judiciary apprehends the
150. E.g., Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. of Gr. Br. and N. Ir. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3,
31-32 (July 25).
151. C.f. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.; N.Z. v. Fr.) 1974 I.C.J. 253, 457 (Dec. 20)
(disappearance of dispute resulting in claim no longer having any object); South West Africa
(Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1966 I.CJ. 6 (July 18).
152. E.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Att'y Gen.
(U.K.) v. Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty 78 A.L.R. 449 (Austl. 1988); Buttes Gas and
Oil Co. v. Hammer (Nos. 2 & 3) [1982] A.C. 888; Att'y Gen. (New Zealand) v. Ortiz 3
W.L.R. 570 (C.A. 1982), aff'd [1984] A.C. 1.
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escalation of an international dispute through its decisions, but the
consequence is that no objective judicial decision is given. The denial of
access to the court for the plaintiff is yet another example of the
subsuming of the individual to the needs of the State and the statist bias of
international law being accepted by the domestic courts.
G. Request for Advisory Opinion
Requesting an advisory opinion may perform dispute resolution
functionsY3  By bringing in international organizations and involving the
international community, an advisory opinion may prevent intensification
of a dispute by clarifying legal rights and duties.m Advisory opinions
have been used by organizations to bolster their own authority and
autonomy, and to widen their participation in dispute resolution processes.
The fact that advisory jurisdiction does not directly depend on the consent
of states may facilitate authoritative clarification of law and, thus, may
contribute to the resolution of the dispute. But the opposite may also be
true. Precisely because the states most closely concerned have not
consented to the request, the effectiveness of the advisory opinion may be
weakened and the articulation and publicity of the request may exacerbate
the dispute, work against its solution, or at the very least, do little to
resolve it.-" Furthermore, the need to frame the question to the Court in
legal terms may once again reduce the situation to bare formulas
susceptible to judicial management, and consequently, the relevant context
of the question may be ignored.
The use of the advisory jurisdiction as a dispute resolution process
is predicated and contingent upon the respect for the authority of
international law and the Court. It also depends upon being able to
present the questions to the Court in a meaningful form that will reflect
the reality of the situation. The limited use of this method of dispute
153. On the advisory jurisdiction of the International Court, see generally KENNETH J.
KEITH, THE ADVISORY JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT (1972); MICHLA
POMERANCE, THE ADVISORY FUNCTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT IN THE LEAGUE
AND U. N. ERAS (1973); DHARMA PRATAP, THE ADVISORY JURISDICTION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT (1972).
154. E.g., Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and
Egypt, 1980 I.C.J. 73 (Dec. 20).
155. E.g., Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16); Legal Consequences for States of
the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21); Certain Expenses of the
United Nations 1962 I.C.J. 151 (July 20). For a discussion as to whether a State is in
reality a participant in the dispute without whose consent the opinion should not be given,
see Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, 1950 I.C.J. 65
(Mar. 30); Status of Eastern Carelia, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser.B), No. 5 (July 23).
[Vol. 7:1 1991]
ANATOMY OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
resolution suggests that neither of these elements is often sufficiently
present.
VI. OUTCOMES
Outcomes must be assessed both in terms of individual
participant's goals and international community goals, the two of which
may not coincide. There may be a reluctance in the international
community to condemn an important or influential State, and thus, an
international dispute may be allowed to dissipate. Only if some member
is prepared to keep the dispute at the forefront of international attention,
or to resurrect it, will the dispute once again become active in the same or
some altered form.' The interest of the international community in the
maintenance of peace and security may be to press for a solution, even if
that solution is not satisfying to some of the participants. For example, in
the dispute over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United Nations
seemed to focus on the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan
and the provision for repatriation of refugees, as if these were sufficient
to resolve the dispute. The Geneva Agreements'" did not and could not
settle the civil war in Afghanistan and, in fact, caused further refugee
flow. This demonstrates that even a complex peace package may not
156. An example is the response of the international community to the events in East
Timor since 1975. Although claims of the denial of self-determination should be addressed
by the international community as a whole and despite condemnation by the Security Council
and General Assembly Indonesia's annexation has been widely accepted. The claims of
Portugal (the previous colonial power) that Indonesia acted illegally have kept the dispute
alive as a bilateral one between Indonesia and Portugal. This has now been extended to a
dispute between Portugal and Australia by Portugal's claims against the legality of the Timor
Gap Zone of Co-operation Treaty between Australia and Indonesia. Portugal claims that
Indonesia has no legal right to the potentially enormous oil resources of the Timor Gap,
except by virtue of its illegal annexation of East Timor and that Australia is giving effect to
that illegality, a claim Australia strongly refutes. Portugal has referred its dispute with
Australia to the International Court. Ironically, the Timor Gap Treaty, which has activated
this dispute with Portugal, was seen as removing a "potential source of bilateral and regional
friction" and "as an imaginative approach to breaking the diplomatic deadlock in delimitation
negotiations" between Australia and Indonesia, Australia Rejects Criticism of 7imor Gap
Treaty, BACKaROUNDER, vol. 1, No. 8, 7-8, February 23, 1990. (Australia Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade. On the Treaty, see Joint Ministerial Statement by Senator
Gareth Evans, Australia Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Mr. Ali Alatas Minister
of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, October 27, (THE MONTHLY RECORD, Oct.
1989, vol. 60, No. 10 at 615-16 (Australian Foreign Affairs and Trade).
157. Agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan on the Principle of Mutual Relations
in Particular of Non-Interference and Non-Intervention, Geneva; Bilateral Agreement
between Afghanistan and Pakistan on the Voluntary Return of Refugees; Afghanistan-
Pakistan-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - United States: International Guarantees;
Accords on the Peaceful Resolution of the Situation in Afghanistan, Geneva, April 14, 1988,
27 I.L.M. 577 (1988).
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resolve the following essential problems: sharing of power, refugees,
religious fundamentalism, physical and economic destruction within the
country and across the borders, and continuing superpower meddling."
Even an apparently unequivocal outcome, such as a treaty or a court
decision, may in fact simply gloss over the layers of the dispute and
provide a cause of future dispute.us
The outcome of the Afghanistan dispute raises yet again the
perennial problem of participation. While Pakistan (as a receiving country
of refugees and a channel for the external assistance to the Mudjahdin)
was included in the peace process, Iran, which also received a large
number of Afghan refugees, was not. Moreover, any realistic settlement
should have allowed for the representation of the Afghan resistance, and
perhaps, even for the millions of people that fled Afghanistan. Such a
proposal, however, could not be readily accommodated within the statist
paradigm of international law.
The establishment of the United States-Iran Tribunal shows how, in
a dispute between States, important individual interests are subjugated to
the overriding concerns of the government and individual claims are
subsumed by the State. This subjugation of individual interests was true
both for the commercial claimants and the hostages themselves, who were
barred from presenting their claims to any jurisdiction.' 6' While
individuals may be participants in an international dispute, they are
typically excluded from the dispute resolution process and may find their
interests ignored when they are not consonant with those of the State. 61
158. When the presence of some participants is never acknowledged, their interests will
be silenced and the outcome will not assist them. Cf. ROBIN MORGAN, THE DEMON LOVER,
ON THE SEXUAUTY OF TERRORISM 91-92 (1989) in which the author analyzes the killing of
hundreds of people at Mecca in 1987 in riots triggered by an Iranian demonstration. The
dispute can be seen as one between Iran and Saudi Arabia and concerns the struggle between
Sunni and Shiite Muslims and is about "identity, about visibility, legitimacy, ethnic
animosity - and about geopolitical power, about economics, about oil." Most of the victims
were women placed at the front of the demonstration; their participation and interests do not
rank highly in most analyses of the dispute.
159. For example, while the 1975 Treaty on Neighbouring Relations between Iran and
Iraq appeared to settle the territorial dispute between Iran and Iraq, it did not prevent the
outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war and may have been a cause of it. The decision of the Court in
the United States-Nicaragua dispute has not brought peace in Central America, and the
arbitral decision of Perez de Cuellar did not finally resolve the dispute over the sinking of
the Rainbow Warrior.
160. Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of
Algeria, Nullification of Sanctions and Claims, q 11; Declaration of the Government of the
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the
Government of the United States and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, art. 2
1 1.
161. Other examples are the disputes involving Rainbow Warrior, South Africa,
Grenada, and Chernobyl.
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Some disputes lead to other disputes in a chain of action and
reaction. The presenting issue may be resolved, but the situation may
remain unchanged so that the dispute's resolution is only apparent. The
parties' goals in referring a dispute to a dispute resolution process may
not coincide, causing disparate perceptions of when, or if, the dispute is
terminated. The agreement apparently settling a dispute may not be
durable, causing a continuation of the dispute when it breaks down.'2
Such an agreement may have been accepted out of expediency, out of
duress, or out of a lack of viable alternatives; when the situation changes,
a participant may feel it appropriate to revive the dispute or an adaptation
of it. Termination of a dispute itself covers a range of situations. It may
comprise, inter alia, the resolution of the core issue without resolution of
the situation;' 6 3 an overall and lasting resolution; the diffusion of crisis and
ongoing attempts at the definitive settlement of dispute;164 a state of
attrition in which nobody is capable of winning at an acceptable cost;'"
or, a stand-off period.'" The dispute may appear terminated because of a
change in the background situation such as a change in technology,"
law,' s or government. In these cases, the dispute is likely to remain
diffused, but not settled. Consequently, a new conflict may emerge when
the situation changes again.'" When it is possible for it to do so, one
162. This occurred in the Rainbow Warrior dispute.
163. Through legal settlement, negotiated compromise, or capitulation, the dispute may
dissipate because its propaganda value or the desire to capitalize on it are exhausted. For
example, Sweden did not want to continue adverse propaganda in the new climate following
Gorbachev's accession to power.
164. While the hostilities in the Falklands might have ended, the dispute clearly has
not. The resumption of diplomatic relations in February 1990 might indicate the beginning
of a new attempt to resolve it. See U.K., Argentina Restore Links, THE SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, Feb. 17, 1990, at 20.
165. Such was the case with the Iran-Iraq conflict. A period of attrition can be used to
attempt to find a more permanent resolution but may also be a time of recuperating and
regrouping for the continuation of the struggle in the future. This can only be judged with
hindsight.
166. This occurred in the Beagle Channel affair in the period between the mediation
and agreement. In a period of stand-off, neither side is prepared or able to escalate the
dispute to the point in which a resolution must be found, but neither is prepared nor able to
forget the dispute, nor make the concessions necessary for it to dissipate.
167. For example, in the dispute about French nuclear tests in the South Pacific, the
facts have changed through technological advances, but the fundamental attitudes of the
parties remain the same.
168. In the Icelandic Fisheries dispute, a change of law allowing for an exclusive
economic zone of 200 miles, which was incorporated into the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea, Art. 57, made it difficult for the United Kingdom to continue to contest
the 50-mile Icelandic fisheries zone, especially because it wished to claim such a zone itself.
169. Australian and New Zealand policies with respect to nuclear matters tend to
fluctuate with the change of government; however, the flexibility of each new government is
limited by the actions of its predecessors. The conclusion and ratification of the South
Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty will make it harder for future governments to change
dramatically the country's policy.
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party may pretend that a dispute is over if it finds that none of its
measures are working. For instance, a party may manipulate numbers or
facts to show that the object of the dispute no longer exists or has been
achieved.1 70 A dispute may effectively be terminated in a domestic arena;
yet, the methods by which this outcome was achieved may provoke a
wider international dispute.
1 71
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The overwhelming impression from the examination of these
disputes is that while the prescriptive process of international law
increasingly caters to individuals, its operation does not. Individuals,
even when their rights are protected by international law and when they
are intimately implicated in a dispute, disappear from the stage of the
dispute resolution process. Participants in international disputes are not
limited to states. In fact, the spectrum of participation grows as new
areas of international concern emerge; the international regulation of
human rights, terrorism, international crimes, the exploitation of natural
resources through private companies, telecommunications, the protection
of the environment, and international business transactions are all likely to
engender non-state participation. Yet dispute resolution processes, in their
goals, participants, procedures, and outcomes, remain geared towards
excluding individuals and downgrading their claims as against those of the
relevant states. Therefore, state interests are ultimately served by these
processes.
The structure for the presentation of international claims requires
that those of individuals be channelled through states. The statist bias in
international dispute resolution is particularly emphasized in cases
involving state responsibility; the international wrongdoing must be
attributable to a state" and is defined in terms of injury to states. Even
when disputes do not involve any wrongdoing giving rise to international
responsibility, as with disputes about the allocation of resources (including
170. For example, Sweden was able to claim (thanks to the changed recording policy
from "possible" to "probable" incursions) that there had been a decrease in incursions by
Soviet submarines and that they had therefore succeeded in their aims. This is also a face-
saving device for the resolution of a dispute.
171. Take, for example, the restoration of internal peace and order in Grenada as a
consequence of the invasion and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, which put an end to
the power struggle there.
172. Examples include the United States-Iran hostage dispute, the Rainbow Warrior
incident, and the Chernobyl incident.
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territory), individual participants such as mining companies must be
sponsored, and their claims espoused, by their states. 73  They may even
find their claims overtaken and obliterated by the state, which may use or
disregard them for its own purposes. The act of state doctrine, as
formulated by the United States, British, Australian, and New Zealand
courts, operates to this effect. 174 The retreat from the absolute doctrine of
state immunity 75 allows for the presentation of commercial claims by
individuals against states, but in matters lure imperii, their interests
remain subordinated to those of the state. Considering that individuals are
generally barred from formal international arenas, it leaves them without
an effective judicial remedy whenever they are participants in an
international dispute unless they are backed by their states. Either way,
individual claimants have no control over the process of dispute resolution
or its outcome.
17 6
Even when international prescription recognizes the right of a
group of people that might become a participant, as in self-determination,
that right is defined by states, and claims for performance are likely to be
unsuccessful unless espoused by the international community as a whole.
This support depends, of course, on the prevailing configuration of
strategic, political, and economic interests rather than overriding legal or
moral principles.' 7
173. Nottebohm is an example of the misfortunes of an individual participant that lacks
standing in the international forum, there being no accepted state willing to espouse the
claim, Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6). Cf. Barcelona Traction
illustrates the same for multinational organizations. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power
Co. (Beig. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5).
174. See supra, note 152 and accompanying text.
175. E.g., Foreign States Immunities Act (Cth), No. 196 (1985); State Immunity Act
(U.K.), c. 19 (1979); State Immunity Act (1979), ch. 313 (Sing.); Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (US), rep. 15 I.L.M. 1388 (1976); European Convention on State Immunity
1972, Europe T.S. No. 74, 11 I.L.M. 470 (1972).
176. A recent example of this in domestic courts is the litigation arising out of the
collapse of the International Tin Council, a situation in which creditors have been unable to.
receive a judgment in their favor in domestic courts nor the European Court of Justice
(settlement was reached before the European Court handed down judgment). While states
entered into commercial contracts with the creditors through the operation of the
International Tin Council, they were able to deny liability for the debts of the organization
they had created and, thus, succeeded in their claims before domestic courts. See
International Tin Council v. Amalgamet Inc., 524 N.Y.S. 2d 971 (1988); J.H. Rayner Ltd.
v. Dept. of Trade 3 W.L.R. 969 (H.L.(E.) 1989). See also ROMANA SADURSKA &
CHRISTINE M. CHINKIN, The Collapse of the International Tin Council: A Case of State
Responsibility; 30 V.J.I.L. 845 (1990).
177. Such factors influenced the international disputes about the status of Namibia, East
Timor and the Western Sahara. Namibia and Western Sahara also demonstrate that recourse
to the advisory jurisdiction of the Court may not be conducive to resolution of the dispute.
The advisory opinion may be simply ignored or misinterpreted by a participant State. See
Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16); Legal Consequences for State of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council
276 (1970), 1971 I.CJ. 16 (June 21).
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The different way in which claims are treated by states may
indicate their hierarchy of values. For instance, important claims of
individuals may be discarded because they are considered by the State as
of lesser importance to it than other foreign policy considerations, or as
intruding into wider state affairs. 7  In disputes about violations of
international law, claimant states want the alleged wrongdoer to stop its
actions, and possibly to make reparations, including an apology. At the
very least they wish to cause it embarrassment, international ostracism,
and isolation.179 When the violation of international law is considered
particularly harmful to an individual state interest or wider community
interests, there may be recourse to measures of self-help. Such self-help
is rarely forcible, except for isolated instances of humanitarian
intervention, and even in these cases there are usually other motivations
for the use of force."0  In situations in which national pride and prestige
or national security are not at stake, strictly humanitarian motives are not
seen by states as warranting the use of force, particularly if the victims
are not their own nationals."' On the other hand, states in territorial
disputes, are more inclined to resort to extensive self-help, including use
of force, and are unwilling to give up their claims. Territory has a
psychological value independent of its intrinsic value, which itself may be
great in terms of resources and strategic significance. Territorial disputes
tend to be long-termi82 because states refuse to give up a claim of
sovereignty, which goes to the very essence of statehood and may involve
national pride. This is magnified when there is potential, or actual,
resource or strategic wealth.
The direct outcome of an international dispute should also be
evaluated in terms of its impact on the prescriptive process, that is, the
formation, confirmation, change, or obliteration of norms of international
law. For instance, the Chernobyl accident provided a stimulus for the
development of international regulation of the nuclear industry; the
Rainbow Warrior incident confirmed state liability for the illegal acts of
its agents; the invasion of Grenada has seemed to erode further the
prohibition of intervention; the tanker war in the Gulf has apparently
178. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
179. These desires are apparent in various allegations of violations of human rights, the
shooting down of KAL 007, and the Rainbow Warrior incident.
180. Examples include the attempted rescue of the hostages in Iran and the rescue at
Entebbe airport.
181. Compare the intervention in Grenada in which it was claimed that United States
nationals were in danger with the lack of response to events in East Timor and Kampuchea
in 1975-79.
182. For example, the Falklands/Malvinas dispute, Venezuela/Guyana; Iran/Iraq; the
Beagle Channel.
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undermined duties of neutrality; and, the acceptance of the Indonesian
invasion of East Timor has challenged the universality of the norm of self-
determination and the collective response through the Security Council to
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait has strengthened the role and effectiveness of
the U.N.
Finally, disputes may be used and claims made in a deliberate
attempt to generate sufficient state practice to create a new norm of
international law, or to reinforce one that is eroding. For instance, the
United States wished to establish that a state sponsoring acts of
international terrorism is liable for those activities along with, or even
separately from, the individual terrorists, and that attack on the sponsor's
territory and assets is a legitimate response."3 Such tactics are especially
attractive when there is frustration with the traditional prescriptive
processes, or with the suitability of other responses to specific types of
activity. Perpetrators of terrorist acts are elusive and they may not have
an identifiable territory, assets, or even nationality; the only tangible
target is the sponsoring state. This again, is symptomatic of the statist
bias of international law: this time with good effect.
Much of what we have said is too tentative and speculative to
formulate any definite conclusions about the nature of international law
and the operation of the international legal system. We have analyzed
certain disputes in order to ask proper questions rather than to provide
answers. We believe that international disputes and dispute resolution
processes constitute a fruitful area of further studies on the development
and functioning of the international order.
183. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.

